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Title Insurance and the Unauthorized
Practice of Law Controversy*
John C. Payne**
I. INTRODUCTION
Title insurance companies are undoubtedly legal entities ves-
ted with the usual attributes of corporate power. To say this
does not admit that they have unlimited capacities or are free to
engage in any activities their managements deem profitable and
desirable. Like other corporations they are restricted by their
own charters, the statutes of the state of their creation, and the
general law of the land.
It has elsewhere been established that, except in a small
minority of states, charter provisions or legislation purporting to
permit title insurance companies to practice law are unconstitu-
tional and abortive.' Even within the minority states, where no
constitutional inhibitions exist, a charge that the companies are
practicing law raises questions of statutory construction. In
such states the question is not whether the state can give the
corporation the power to practice law, but whether it has done
so, thus precluding the charge that the company is acting ultra
vires. However, this article will not be primarily concerned
with the small minority. We will assume that statutory author-
ity cannot constitutionally be given to a corporation, and will
inquire whether the activities of the companies fall within com-
mon law definitions of the practice of law. Where the definitions
are so vague and uncertain as to permit considerable latitude in
their application, the question will be: What issues of policy are
involved, and what course should the courts follow in dealing
with the title insurance enterprise?
In pursuing this inquiry, attention will be centered upon
cases in which individuals are purchasing homes. The use of
title insurance in commercial transactions may sometimes be
spectacular because of the sums involved, but businessmen are
generally flanked by their own attorneys and receive adequate
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advice and assurance. Problems involving unauthorized prac-
tice do not ordinarily arise in such a context. Although the
single house transaction may seem less significant than many
commercial transactions, home purchases constitute the bulk of
property transfers, are the stock in trade of the title insurance
industry, and raise the most acute problems of unauthorized
practice. The average home buyer is unrepresented by counsel
and is unaware of the legal complexities normally a part of the
conveyancing process. For this reason he turns to the layman,
not infrequently a title insurer, for the assistance he requires.
Therefore, the possibility that title insurance companies are il-
legally practicing law can best be considered if their activities
are scrutinized in connection with the sale of an ordinary home.
II. THE MATRIX OF POSITIVE LAW
A. DEFINING THE PRACTICE OF LAW
The general law of unauthorized practice is a recent phe-
nomenon, hardly pre-dating the Depression of the 1930's.2 It
therefore still lacks clearly enunciated principles. Although it
has been stated that statutes forbidding the unauthorized prac-
tice of law are sufficiently definite and embrace acts commonly
understood to be the practice of law,3 it is more often assumed
2. J. HURST, GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN LAW 323 (1950) [herein-
after cited as HURST]; Preface to G. BRAND, UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE DECI-
SIONS (1937); Report of the Standing Committee on Unauthorized Prac-
tice of Law, 84 A.B.A. REP. 590 (1959); Report of the Special [later
Standing] Committee on Unauthorized Practice, 56 A.B.A. REP. 470
(1931); Sanders, Foreword to symposium on The Unauthorized Practice
of Law Controversy, 5 LAw & CONTEmP. PROB. 1 (1938); 59 A.B.A. REP.
155 (1934). It was not until the pericd 1929-1939 that unauthorized
practice decisions appeared in large numbers in the A=RicAu DIGEST
(Fourth Decennial).
3. E.g., People ex rel. Lawyers Institute v. Merchants' Protective
Corp., 189 Cal. 531, 209 P. 363 (1922); Grievance Comm. v. Dacey, 154
Conn. 129, 222 A.2d 339 (1966), appeal dismissed, 386 U.S. 683 (1967);
McMillen v. McCahan, 167 N.E.2d 541 (Ohio C.P. 1960); Campbell v.
Third Dist. Comm., 179 Va. 244, 18 S.E.2d 883 (1942).
In Stern v. State Bd. of Law Examiners, 245 Ind. 526, 199 N.E.2d
850 (1964) and State Bar v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 90 Ariz. 76,
366 P.2d 1 (1961), modified on rehearing, 91 Ariz. 293, 371 P.2d 1020
(1962), it was admitted that while the definition of the practice of law
might be somewhat hazy, it had a fairly well-defined connotation which
had developed through long usage.
In 1955 the representative of the American Bar Associations Stand-
ing Committee on Unauthorized Practice, reporting to the House of
Delegates, took the position that "the phrase, practice of law, is a well
defined one and has been constantly applied by the courts over a long
period of time.. . ." 80 A.B.A. REP. 169 (1955).
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that no all-embracing definition can be formulated,4 and that
courts should use a case-by-case approach based upon the facts
presented in each.5 The consequence of such a pragmatic ap-
proach has been referred to as a "wilderness of single instances.16
Yet, review of the general principles employed by the courts in
determining whether certain activities are to be made the mo-
nopoly of the bar should preface any discussion of specific cases.
Initially it can be said that lawyers are officers of the court.7
At common law corporations cannot engage in practice,8 nor-
except in legislative supremacy states-can they be given any
such power by statute. The monopoly enjoyed by the bar is con-
ferred not to enhance its own interest but to protect the public.9
4. E.g., Creeknore v. Izard, 236 Ark. 558, 367 S.W.2d 419 (1963);
Denver Bar Ass'n v. Public Util. Conm'n, 154 Colo. 273, 391 P.2d 467
(1964); State v. Sperry, 140 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 1962), rev'd on other
grounds, 373 U.S. 379 (1963), decree modified, 159 So. 2d 229 (1964);
People v. Barasch, 406 IR1. 253, 94 N.E.2d 148 (1950); Bump v. Barnett,
235 Iowa 308, 16 N.W.2d 579 (1944).
It was said in State v. Indiana Real Estate Ass'n, 244 Ind. 214, 191
N.E.2d 711 (1963), that "there is a twilight zone between the area of
activity which is clearly permitted to the layman, and that which is
denied him."
5. E.g., Automobile Club v. Hoffmeister, 338 S.W.2d 348 (St.
Louis Ct. App. 1960); State v. Childe, 139 Neb. 91, 295 N.W. 381 (1941)
(quoting Judge Holmes that general propositions do not decide con-
crete cases), accord on later appeal, 147 Neb. 527, 23 N.W.2d 720
(1946); Sparkman v. State Bd. of Bar Examiners, 77 N.M. 551, 425 P.2d
313 (1967); State v. Rice, 236 Wis. 38, 294 N.W. 550 (1940); State v.
Hardy, 61 Wyo. 172, 156 P.2d 309 (1945). See Q. JOHNSTONE & D. HopsoN,
LAWYERS Am THEiR WoRx 176 (1967) [hereinafter cited as JOHNSTONE &
HoPsoN]. Even the American Bar Association's Standing Committee on
Unauthorized Practice is reported to have considered it impossible and
undesirable to define the practice of law. Nelson, Drafting of Real
Estate Instruments: The Problem from the Standpoint of the Realtors,
5 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 57, 59 (1938).
6. Note, The Lawyer's Exclusive Province, 83 U. PA. L. REv. 357
(1935).
7. Goodman, The Historic Role of the Oath of Admission, 11 Am.
J. LEGAL HIsT. 404 (1967).
8. It has been said that there exists "no judicial dissent" from
this proposition. Annot., 73 A.L.R. 1327, 1328 (1931). See also supple-
mentary annotations, 105 A.L.R. 271, 282 (1936); W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA
or THE LAW OF PRIVATE ComRoRTIONS § 2524 (rev. 1950).
9. E.g., Beach Abstract & Guar. Co. v. Bar Ass'n, 230 Ark 494, 326
S.W.2d 900 (1959); State v. Sperry, 140 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 1962), rev'd on
other grounds, 373 U.S. 379 (1963), decree modified, 159 So. 2d 229 (Fla.
1963); Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Quinlan & Tyson, Inc., 53 Ill. App. 2d 388,
203 N.E.2d 131 (1964), modified on other grounds, 34 Ill. 2d 116, 214
N.E.2d 771 (1966); Hoffmeister v. Tod, 349 S.W.2d 5 (Mo. 1961); New
Jersey State Bar Ass'n v. Northern N.J. Mortgage Associates, 32 N.J.
430, 161 A.2d 257 (1960), modified in part, 34 N.J. 301, 169 A.2d 150
(1961); Pioneer Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. State Bar, 74 Nev. 186, 326
19691
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
The rule forbidding practice by corporations or unlicensed indi-
viduals has nothing to do with competence in a particular field.'0
It is predicated upon the hypothesis that those engaged in legal
practice should not only have minimal training but should also
be subject to canons of ethics and disciplinary action by the
courts." The relation between attorney and client is confiden-
tial; the same relationship cannot exist between a corporation
and an individual or between two corporations. 12  Similar
reasoning prohibits a corporation or unlicensed individual from
practicing law through licensed attorneys. 3 To allow this would
be to establish conflict in the attorney's loyalty to his employer
and to his client, a conflict forbidden by traditional canons of
ethics' 4 and inconsistent with a trust xelationship. 5
P.2d 408 (1958); West Virginia State Bar v. Earley, 144 W. Va. 504, 109
S.E.2d 420 (1959).
10. E.g., Grievance Comm. v. Dacey, 154 Conn. 129, 222 A.2d 339
(1966); Gardner v. Conway, 234 Minn. 468, 48 N.W.2d 788 (1951);
Green v. Huntington Nat'l Bank, 3 Ohio App. 2d 62, 209 N.E.2d 228
(1964), aff'd, 4 Ohio St. 2d 78, 212 N.E.2d 585 (1965); In re Droker, 59
Wash. 2d 707, 370 P.2d 242 (1962).
11. E.g., Gardner v. Conway, 234 Minn. 468, 48 N.W.2d 788 (1951);
In re Bercu, 273 App. Div. 524, 78 N.Y.S.2d 209 (1948), aff'd mem., 299
N.Y. 728, 87 N.E.2d 451 (1949); Liebtag v. Dilworth, 25 Pa. D. & C.2d 221
(1961); State v. Keller, 16 Wis. 2d 377, 114 N.W.2d 796 (1962) [for sub-
sequent proceedings based on other grounds, see 374 U.S. 102 (1963);
21 Wis. 2d 100, 123 N.W.2d 905 (1963); 376 U.S. 902 (1964); 377 U.S. 964
(1964) ].
12. E.g., People ex rel. Lawyers Institute v. Merchants' Protective
Corp., 189 Cal. 531, 209 P. 363 (1922); Kentucky State Bar Ass'n v. First
Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n, 342 S.W.2d 397 (Ky. 1961); In re Shoe Mfrs.
Protective Ass'n, 295 Mass. 369, 3 N.E.2d 746 (1936); In re Cooperative
Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 92 N.E. 15 (1910); Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v.
Automobile Serv. Ass'n, 55 R.I. 122, 179 A. 139 (1935); Richmond Ass'n
of Credit Men v. Bar Ass'n, 167 Va. 327, 189 S.E. 153 (1937); W. FLETcHEP,
supra note 8.
13. E.g., Howe v. State Bar, 212 Cal. 222, 298 P. 25 (1931); People
v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176 N.E. 901 (1931);
Bay County Bar Ass'n v. Finance Systems, Inc., 345 Mich. 434, 76 N.W.2d
23 (1956); In re Otterness, 181 Minn. 254, 232 N.W. 318 (1930); Seawell
v. Carolina Motor Club, 209 N.C. 624, 184 S.E. 540 (1936); Rattikin
Title Co. v. Grievance Comm., 272 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954);
In re Droker, 59 Wash. 2d 707, 370 P.2d 242 (1962).
14. E.g., State Bar v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 90 Ariz. 76,
366 P.2d 1 (1961), modified on rehearing, 91 Ariz. 293, 371 P.2d 1020
(1962); Title Guar. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo. 423, 312 P.2d 1011
(1957); C.S. Dudley & Co. v. Missouri, 340 Mo. 852, 102 S.W.2d 895,
cert. denied, 302 U.S. 693 (1937); New Jersey State Bar Ass'n v.
Northern N.J. Mortgage Associates, 32 N.J. 430, 161 A.2d 257 (1960),
modified, 34 N.J. 301, 169 A.2d 150 (1961); Pioneer Title Ins. & Trust Co.
v. State Bar, 74 Nev. 186, 326 P.2d 408 (1958); State v. James Sanford
Agency, 167 Tenn. 339, 69 S.W.2d 895 (1934); Hexter Title & Abstract
Co. v. Grievance Comm., 142 Tex. 506, 179 S.W.2d 946 (1944). On this
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Courts have often attempted to define the practice of law in
broad language. 16 These definitions are not confined simply to
court appearances and preparation of pleadings, but embrace the
drafting of instruments, the giving of advice and similar activ-
ities. The decisive question, therefore, is the nature of the act
and not where it is done.17
The most celebrated exposition of what constitutes legal
work is found in the Opinion of the Justices, a Massachusetts
Supreme Court advisory opinion declaring unconstitutional a
proposed statute exempting certain types of corporations, includ-
ing title insurance companies, from the prohibition against lay
practice. The court found that the statute invaded the inherent
power of the judiciary:' 8
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small
part of work performed outside of any court and having no im-
mediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces convey-
ancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects,
and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering
an extensive field of business and trust relations and other af-
fairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connec-
tion with court proceedings, they are always subject to become
involved in litigation. They require -in many aspects a high de-
gree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and
issue the court said in Hightower v. Detroit Edison Co., 262 Mich. 1, 9,
247 N.W. 97, 99 (1933),
The rights and duties arising out of the relationship of attorney
and client are not measured by the yardstick of commercial or
trade transactions. The relation is purely personal. The law-
yer owes to his client undivided allegiance. There is no place
in the relationship for its establishment by a middleman, having
an interest in the res or control of the procedure.
Another court has stated, "A lawyer cannot serve two masters." State
v. James Sanford Agency, 167 Tenn. at 345, 69 S.W.2d at 898. For an
excellent general summary, see Note, The Unauthorized Practice of
Law by Law Organizations Providing the Services of Attorneys, 72
HARv. L. REv. 1334 (1959).
15. E.g., People ex rel. Lawyers Institute v. Merchants Protective
Corp., 189 Cal. 531, 209 P. 363 (1922); People v. Association of Real
Estate Taxpayers, 354 Ill. 102, 187 N.E. 823 (1933); In re Shoe Mfrs.
Protective Ass'n., 295 Mass. 369, 3 N.E.2d 746' (1936); In re Battelle
Memorial Institute, 170 N.E.2d 774 (Ohio C.P., 1960) [for subsequent
proceedings, see 172 N.E.2d 917 (1961) and. 173 N.E.2d 201 (1961)].
16. The four most widely quoted cases are: People v. Peoples'
Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Il1. 462, 176 N.E. 901 (1931); Eley v. Miller,
7 Ind. App. 529, 34 N.E. 836 (1893); Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass.
606, 194 N.E. 313 (1935); In re Duncan, 83 S.C. 186, 65 S.E. 210 (1909).
17. E.g., Grievance Comm. v. Dacey, 154 Conn. 129, 222 A.2d 339
(1966); People v. Goodman, 366 111. 346, 8 N.E.2d 941, cert. denied, 302
U.S. 728, rehearing denied, 302 U.S. 777 (1937); State v. Butterfield,
172 Neb. 645, 111 N.W.2d 543 (1961); State v. Childe, 147 Neb. 527, 23
N.W.2d 720 (1946), reaf'g 139 Neb. 91, 295 N.W. 381 (1941).
18. 289 Mass. 607, 613-14, 194 N.E. 313, 317 (1935) (emphasis added).
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a great capacity for the adaption to difficult and complex situa-
tions. These "customary functions of an attorney or counselor
at law" (as they are described in question 2 of the order) bear
an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the
courts. No valid distinction, so far as the question set forth in
the order, can be drawn between the part of the work of the law-
yer which involves appearance in the court and that part which
involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. The
work of the office lawyer is the groundwork for future possible
contests in courts. It has profound effect on the whole scheme
of the administration of justice. It is performed with that pos-
sibility in mind, and otherwise would hardly be needed. In
this country the practice of law includes both forms of legal
service; there is no separation, as in England, into barristers and
solicitors. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that
these manifold customary functions be performed by persons
possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral char-
acter, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligation to
clients which rests upon all attorneys. The underlying reasons
which prevent corporations, associations and individuals other
than members of the bar from appearing before the courts apply
with equal force to the performance of these customary func-
tions of attorneys and counsellors at law outside of courts. De-
cisions of the courts, some of which deal with statutes, are unan-
imous on these points, so far as we are aware. If these estab-
lished principles as to the practice of law are ever to be changed,
the judicial department of the government must act to that end.
But no definition of the practice of law has proved satis-
factory.19 Obviously the illegal practice doctrine cannot be in-
voked in every instance where an instrument having legal effect
is drafted by a person not a party thereto. Nor does it apply
whenever advice predicated upon legal assumptions is given. As
a practical matter, the world's business, including a large per-
centage of its commercial transactions, could not be carried on if
the courts were to hold otherwise, since every businessman can-
not perpetually carry a lawyer in his hip pocket. Where then is
the line to be drawn? The answer the law gives is that each type
of endeavor-banking, accountancy, claims adjusting, collections,
and the like-will be considered on its own merits. By a process
of inclusion and exclusion the courts will determine which acts
can be performed by laymen and which require the services of an
attorney.
There are few cases dealing specifically with title insurance.
These deal almost exclusively with peripheral activities 20 of
the companies and ignore crucial underlying issues. They exhibit
19. For a penetrating analysis of the difficulties involved in defini-
tion, see Sanders, Foreword, supra note 2.
20. Meyer, Title Companies and Their Relationship with the Bar,
37 J. STATE BAR or CAL. 309 (1962).
[Vol. 53:423
TITLE INSURANCE
no "feel" for nor awareness of the mechanics of property trans-
fers nor for the conceptual distinctions forced upon us by ju-
dicial, as compared with legislative, supremacy theories. They
often rely upon cases which do not involve title insurance. While
such reliance is sometimes justified, often functional distinctions
between dissimilar enterprises are ignored.
Extra-judicial discussion has been equally unsatisfactory
and sterile.21 Non-academic writers have tended toward the
polemical and self-serving, while the schoolmen have made short
shrift of the whole question, apparently upon the assumption
that title insurance companies will take over traditional convey-
ancing in its entirety,22 and that nothing is to be gained by
creating theoretical obstacles to the inevitable. Whether such a
supposition is well-grounded or not, it contains a vice of self-
fortification and cuts off debate at the very point where it
should begin. Admittedly, some companies have succeeded in
taking over conveyancing within their own locale. Other com-
panies have the same objective and are moving rapidly toward
its achievement. But must the courts accept as legal a fait ac-
compli that would otherwise violate sound principle? Even if
no retreat from the status quo is attempted, will the courts per-
mit the movement which produced that situation to continue un-
checked and unmodified in the future? At this point no one can
confidently predict the answers to these questions. We can, how-
ever, examine existing doctrine and consider what functional
questions may be relevant to future discourse.
21. The best treatments are found in Annot., 85 A.L.R. 2d 184; Ad-
ler, Lawyers and Title Insurance Companies, 22 UNAUTaORIZED PIRCTICE
NEws 13 (No. 3, 1956); Balbach, Title Assurances: A New Approach to
Unauthorized Practice, 41 NOTRE DAmvE LAw. 192 (1965); Hamner, Title
Insurance Companies and the Practice of Law, 14 BAYLOR L. REV. 384
(1962); Murphy, The Activities of Title Insurance Companies in NA-
TIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW 149 (mimeo.
1962); Note, Unauthorized Practice of Law by Realtors and Title Insur-
ance Companies, 49 Ky. L.J. 384 (1961); Note, Unauthorized Practice of
Law by Real Estate Brokers and Title Insurance Companies, 36 NoTRE
DAME LAW. 374 (1961); Comment, 7 N.Y.L.F. 191 (1967). The reader
should also consult the annual reports issued by the American Bar
Association's Committee on the Unauthorized Practice and the reports
and pamphlets issued by the Special Committee on Lawyers' Guaranty
Funds.
22. Cribbett, The Lawyer's Role in panel discussion, Lawyer and
Title Insurance, 1 REAL PROPERTY, PROB. & TRUST L.J. 355 (1966); Rob-
erts, Urban Conveyancing Techniques in America, 27 CoNvEY. (n.s.)
240 (1963).
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B. TRADITIONAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR TmE INSURANCE C0wANY
ACTIVITIES
When a national title insurance company issues a policy pre-
dicated on a certificate furnished by an independent attorney,
the company's officials may exercise some legal judgment. For
example, they may decide whether reported title defects should
be waived and, if not, what curative action will be demanded.
This is no more thought to constitute corporate practice of law
than a demand by a corporate trustee that certain provisions be
included in a trust instrument. Generally, the title insurer per-
forms purely ministerial duties in issuing the policy, thereby pro-
viding protection against errors made by the examining attorney
and defects not of record. Purely national insurers are not en-
gaged in unauthorized practice. To hold otherwise would be to
hold title insurance illegal in toto, a result fraught with far
ranging and deleterious consequences.
A radically different situation arises when companies main-
tain their own title plants, issuing insurance policies based upon
the examination and legal evaluation of title by their own sal-
aried employees. While such policies are sometimes issued only
to practicing attorneys, 23 coverage may also be furnished to lay
individuals and corporations.. Yet, it has apparently been uni-
versally assumed that in neither instance is the company prac-
ticing law, even though peripheral activities of the companies
have been enjoined by the courts.24 The remarkable fact is that
in only scattered cases does the question seem to have been
touched on at all,25 and nowhere can there be found any real
discussion of the point.
The rationale, whether tacit or expressed, upon which con-
ventional assumption seems to rest can be stated as follows:
23. Title Companies' Code 6f Ethics to Protect Lawyers, 24 UNAU-
THORIZED PRACTICE NEWS 38 (No. 2, 1958).
24. E.g., New Jersey State Bar Ass'n v. Northern N.J. Mortgage
Associates, 32 N.J. 430, 161 A.2d 257 (1930), modified, 34 N.J. 301, 169
A-2d 150 (1961); Hexter Title & Abstract Co. v. Grievance Comm.,
142 Tex. 506, 179 S.W.2d 946 (1944).
25. E.g., Cooperman v. West Coast Title Co., 75 So. 2d 818 (Fla.
1954). The recent case of Georgia Bar Ass'n v. Lawyers Title Ins.
Corp., 222 Ga. 657, 151 ,S.E.2d 718 (1966), appears to be a judicial
"sport." Neither the original pleadings nor the evidence are contained
in the printed report. The former are so confused, prolix, and re-
dundant that it is difficult or impossible to tell what issues were raised
by the parties. However, the answer of the defendant bar association
specifically states that the defendant "is not objecting to the defend-
ant's issuing policies of insurance but to its illegal practice of law in
the preparation of title instruments by salaried attorneys."
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(1) Title insurance is a legitimate sector of the insurance industry
as a whole, and it has never been suggested that the under-
writing of insurance is the practice of law. Moreover, title
insurance companies are lawful bodies empowered by their
charters and by legislation to insure titles.
(2) In any event, long toleration and the development of bene-
ficial institutions based on such toleration have now created
an estoppel.
(3) If the companies function as insurers, they have the right to
examine the risk they are undertaking and may do so even
though the examination involves the exercise of legal judg-
ment-a conclusion supported by the well-recognized rule
that a layman may represent himself.
Although superficially, this line of reasoning is highly per-
suasive and has been unquestioningly accepted, yet it may be
fallacious in all its premises. Before any fallacies are examined,
however, a rather startling line of inquiry presents itself. Why,
up to now, has an entire industry been built on dubious legal
assumptions with no challenge of these assumptions? The title
insurers have invaded and threaten to usurp one of the tradi-
tional fields of legal practice. The key to the whole convey-
ancing process is the examination of title, work requiring the
most detailed knowledge of property law. Title examination is
also the element of the conveyancing process for which the major
portion of the compensation is paid. For laymen to abrogate
this function without even a suggestion from the bar that they
are engaged in unauthorized practice is a phenomenon so extra-
ordinary as to demand explanation. None has been offered, and
one can theorize only that the reasons lie in history rather than
in logic.
The first title insurance company was organized in Pennsyl-
vania in 1876.26 It was incorporated under a specific statute27 in
a state where conveyancing has always been considered a lay
function.28 The company was established by lawyers to protect
26. D. GAGE, LAND TrLE AssuRING AGENcIES n THE UNITED STATES,
80-82 (1937). Roberts, in Urban Conveyancing, supra note 22, has done
something to take the glamor out of the traditional account and has
elsewhere said that the title industry was the "product of improvization
in the face of crisis." Roberts, Title Insurance: State Regulation and
the Public Perspective, 39 IND. L.J. 1, 7 (1963).
27. PA. P.L. Act. No. 32, § 29 (1874).
28. La Brum v. Commonwealth Title Co., 358 Pa. 239, 56 A.2d 246
(1948); Watson v. Muirhead, 57 Pa. 161 (1868); Roberts, Urban Convey-
ancing, supra note 22.
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the public against the non-liability of lay scriveners following the
decision in Watson v. Muirhead.29 It appears that the next com-
panies were organized in Washington (presumably the District
of Columbia) and in Maryland.80 Maryland was a legisla-
tive-supremacy state,31 and in the District there was no regula-
tion of the practice of law.32 In 1882 or 1884,3 3 title insurance
spread to New York City34 under statutory authorization 35 of the
29. 57 Pa. 161 (1868).
30. E. ROBERTS, PUBLIC REGULATION OF TITLE INSURANCE CoIpANms
AND ABsTRAcTERs 2 (1961) [hereinafter cited as ROBERTS]. The regula-
tion of admissions to practice and the control of the bar in the District
of Columbia have presented peculiar and special problems not encoun-
tered elsewhere. In re Fletcher, 107 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1939), cert.
denied, 309 U.S. 664, rehearing denied, 209 U.S. 698 (1940); Merrick v.
American Security & Trust Co., 107 F.2d 271 (D.C. Cir. 1939), cert. denied,
308 U.S. 625 (1940); Laughlin v. Clephane, 77 F. Supp. 103 (D.D.C.
1947); Practice of Law in District of Columbia, 19 UNAUTH ORIZED PRAc-
TICE NEWS (No. 1) 9 (1953); Note, JUI)IcL POWER TO CONTROL AD-
MSSION TO THE BAR, 8 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1085 (1940).
31. Payne, supra note 1. For the history of the early development
of lay conveyancing in Maryland, see Benson, Notes on the Preparation
of Conveyances by Laymen in the Colony of Maryland, 60 MD. HIsT.
MAG. 428 (1965).
32. As late as 1965 a Congressional committee pointed out the
great difficulty of regulation in the District and said that title companies
habitually carried out complete title transactions without an attorney.
The dispute at that time was between real estate agents and lawyers.
Practice of Law: Hearings on H.R. 556 before Subcomm. No. 3 of the
House Comm. on the District of Columbia, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
33. D. GAGE, supra note 26; G. RIcBaRns, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
INSURANCE § 10 (2d ed. 1892). In ROBERTS, supra note 30, at 2, it is in-
dicated that the actual organization of a title insurance company in New
York may have been as late as 1887. This discrepancy in no way alters
the basic history of the title insurance movement.
34. In New York City title examination has virtually ceased to be
a part of lawyers' work. JOHNSTONE & HopsoN, supra note 5, at 153.
However a modus vivendi has been reached between the bar and the
companies. Under this arrangement the companies confine their activities
to examining titles and lawyers perform the "legal work." Proposed
Standard, supra. JOHNSTONE & HOPsON, supra note 5, at 145-46 seems
to conclude that real estate practice has become highly specialized and
that title work is only a "small-time" activity carried out in peripheral
areas. But see Condominium Title Closings, 44 TITLE NEWS 21-22 (No. 9,
1965). This arrangement has recently broken down, with the companies
taking over work previously performed by independent lawyers. The
Wall Street Journal, Aug. 6, 1965, at 1, col. 6. In 1958 Nelson stated that
93.85 per cent of all title policies written in the state were issued on
property located in New York City, Westchester, Nassau and Suffolk
counties. Nelson, Conveyancing in New 'York, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 617, 623
n.52 (1957). Outside these areas the greatest diversity of title practice
prevails. Reiffenstein, Pitfalls in Title Closings, 27 N.Y. STATE BAR
BULL. 352 (1955); Proposed Standard of Fair Practice for Title Com-
panies and Attorneys, UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE NEWS 45 (No. 1, 1958).
35. LAWS OF NEW YORK ch. 392 (1882); id. ch. 367 (1883); id.
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legislature, the ultimate admitting power. The 1871 destruction
of the Cook County land records by the Chicago fire made some
new form of title assurance imperative. An abstract company,
the predecessor of the Chicago Title and Trust Company, had
saved its records from the holocaust, so continued to sell ab-
stracts. In 1887 the company issued its first title insurance pol-
icy.3
0
The subsequent spread of title insurance to other states has
not been adequately traced, although progress is generally
thought to have been relatively slow, centering in the large cities.
What is apparently the first encyclopedic discussion of the new
institution3 7 in 1904 cited cases from New York, Pennsylvania,
Minnesota, 38 New Jersey, and Georgia. 39 In 1911 another ency-
clopedia 40 cited additional cases from Missouri4 1 and California.42
ch. 167 (1884). For a summary of the New York legislation, see Fred-
erici v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 250 App. Div. 432, 294 N.Y.S. 318, motion
for reargument denied, motion for leave to appeal granted, 250 ApP.
Div. 864, 296 N.Y.S. 980 (1937) (no appeal taken).
36. JOIHSTONE & HoPsoN, supra note 5, at 285, 288. Title insurance,
however, did not immediately surpass conventional abstract practice.
It was not until 1922 that orders for title insurance equaled those for ab-
stracts. Julin, The Lawyer and Title Insurance, 10 Wyo. L.J. 39 (1955).
Today virtually all Chicago land titles are either insured by the Chicago
Title & Trust Company or are registered under the Illinois Torrens Act.
Lawyers accept title examination by the company as a matter of
course. The chief complaints about unauthorized practice center around
the activities of real estate brokers. J. CARLIN, LAwYERs ON THEIR
OWN 52 passim (1962); cf. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Quinlan & Tyson, Inc.,
53 IlL. App. 2d 388, 203 N.E.2d 131 (1964), modified on other grounds,
34 Ill. 2d 116, 214 N.E.2d 771 (1966).
37. 28 AsmERcAw & ENGLISH ENCYC. or LAW 229 (2d ed. 1904).
The topic is omitted from the first edition (1887-1895). The discus-
sions found in 1 R. COOLEY, BRIEFS ON THE LAw OF INSURANCE 12 (1905);
T. FROST, A TREATISE ON GUARANTY INSURANCE, ch. XVII (1902); J.
JOYCE, TRATISE ON INSURANCE § 13 (1897); RICHARDS, supra note 33;
and Note, Guarantee and Title Insurance, 42 CENT. L.J. 445 (1896), are
not helpful in tracing the spread of title insurance. They simply treat
it as one branch of the law of insurance and discuss the cases decided
up to that time.
38. Title insurance companies were first authorized by statute in
Minnesota in 1887. See Historical Resume, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 231
(1946).
39. It is impossible from the report of the case relied upon, Ex
parte Calhoun, 87 Ga. 359, 13 S.E. 694 (1891), to determine whether a
title insurance company or an abstracting company was involved.
40. 38 Cyc. 344-55 (1911).
41. In the report of the merger of the Kansas City Title Insurance
Company with the Chicago Title & Trust Company it is stated that
when the former was incorporated in 1915 "it was the first Missouri
company established for the purpose of insuring titles to real estate."
46 TITLE NEWS 25 (No. 7, 1967). However, at least one Missouri case
in which a title insurance company was a defendant was decided as
1969]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Gage43 asserts that at the turn of the century there were prob-
ably not more than 20 companies operating in the large cit-
ies of California, Washington, Minnesota, Illinois, Ohio, Penn-
sylvania, New Jersey, Maryland, New York, Massachusetts 44
and the District of Columbia. By 1930 the number had increased
to approximately 263 companies in 35 states.45 That number has
since been drastically reduced,46 but this reduction has been the
result of mergers and has been accompanied by an over-all in-
crease in premium income and area of operations.
early as 1902. Purcell v. Land Title Guar. Co., 94 Mo. App. 5, 67 S.W. 726
(1902). This case originated in Jackson County (Kansas City). The
problem of proper title assurance in some parts of Missouri presents
peculiar difficulties. First, there was a great deal of fraud connected
with alleged Spanish and French grants antedating the Louisiana Pur-
chase and titles derived from such grants were the subject of much
uncertainty and litigation. Gill, The Beginning of Title in St. Louis,
7 ST. Louis L. REv. 69 (1922); Litz, Spanish Land Grants, 23 J. Mo. BAR
206 (1967); Nelles & King, Contempt by Publication in the United
States, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 401, 423 passim (1928). Secondly, in five
southern counties the public records were destroyed by fire or flood.
Russ v. Sims, 261 Mo. 27, 169 S.W. 69 (1914). This latter difficulty led
to the enactment of the so-called Carleton's Act, Mo. LAws 251 (1901).
This act was declared unconstitutional but was re-enacted in a consti-
tutional form by Mo. LAWS 271 (1907), now found as Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 446.190 (1959). See M. GILL, MissoUnr TiTLES § 385 (4th ed. 1960).
42. Title Insurance was established in California prior to 1910.
Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 61 Cal. App. 232, 214 P. 667
(1923). The relationship between the development of title companies
and the acute need created by the destruction of the public land records
in th6 San Francisco earthquake of 1906 does not seem to have been
investigated. It should be kept in mind that although California has
ultimately become a judicial supremacy state, early cases recognized the
power of the legislature to regulate practice. E.g., State Bar v. Superior
Court, 207 Cal. 323, 278 P. 432 (1929); In re Weymann, 92 Cal. App. 646,
268 P. 971 (1928); In re Chapelle, 71 Cal. App. 129, 234 P. 906 (1925);
In re Collins, 188 Cal. 701, 206 P. 990 (1922); Ex parte Galusha, 184 Cal.
697, 195 P. 406 (1921); Ex parte Johnson, 47 Cal. App. 465, 190 P. 852
(1920); City of Sonora v. Curtin, 137 Cal. 583, 70 P. 674 (1902); Ex
parte Yale, 24 Cal. 241 (1864); Cohen v. Wright, 22 Cal. 293, (1863).
43. D. GAGE, supra note 26, at 83.
44. This last named state comes somewhat as a surprise. Tradi-
tionally New England has been considered a personal search area and
the recent modest spread of title companies into the area has occasioned
comment. Nevertheless, the Massachusetts Title Insurance Company
currently advertises itself in 2 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY 777
(1968) as "One of the oldest title insurance companies in the United
States and the only title insurance company with its home office in
Boston."
45. D. GAGE, supra note 26, at 85. This expansion was probably en-
couraged by the enactment of a large number of statutes purporting to
legitimize the institution. See, for a list of earlier statutes, Pelkey, The
Law of Title Insurance, 12 MARQ. L. REV. 33 n.4 (1927).
46. The number was reduced to an estimated 150 in 1966. See
Payne, supra note 1.
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This brief historical summary indicates that title insurance
began at a time when no efforts were being made to check lay
practice. After starting in Pennsylvania, it spread first into
states where either legislative supremacy prevailed or an emer-
gency situation presented itself. By the time the unauthorized
practice controversy arose, title insurance companies were taken
as a matter of course and their assumption of the right to pass
judgment upon land titles was not questioned.
The failure to raise such a fundamental issue was partly due
to the form of the dialogue. It would have been possible for the
courts to relate title insurance directly to the conveyancing pro-
cess, which would have undoubtedly been proper. Instead, the
insurance label was accepted at face value and the courts habit-
ually spoke as though they were simply dealing with a new facet
of an old and well recognized lay enterprise. No distinction was
made between the work of pure insurance and that of title ex-
amination. To be sure, the courts had no occasion to do other-
wise, for the bar was too weak to challenge the new companies
on the grounds that they were illegally practicing law,47 and the
companies were not likely to question the validity of their own
activities. As a result, the cases have not distinguished between
the functions of local and national companies, and it has been
assumed without analysis that if the companies can insure title,
they can also examine it.4 8 Thus it would appear that the tra-
47. The weakness of the bar was accentuated in this case because
in New York and Chicago, at least, the title insurance companies were
closely affiliated with banks, who insisted on title insurance as a pre-
requisite to acquisition of loans. Roberts, Urban Mortgage Techniques
in America, 27 CONVEY. 240 (1963); Viele, The Problem of Land Titles,
44 POL. ScL. Q. 421, 430-31 (1929). Roberts states that in Pennsylvania
title insurance
... was part and parcel of the banking industry, almost every
bank having its own title department. Whereas in New York
City the title insurance phase of banking may simply have been
a lucrative sideline, in Pennsylvania title insurance was a device
used to get around restrictive banking laws which limited the
number of banks in any given area. This was done by opening
a title company, which had the ancillary power to lend money
and accept deposits, the "Title and Trust Company" shortly
becoming a standard feature of the Pennsylvania scene.
Title Insurance: State Regulation and the Public Perspective, supra
note 26.
48. As expressed in Wollitzer v. National Title Guar. Co., 148 Misc.
529, 533, 266 N.Y.S. 184, 189 (Supp. Ct. 1933), aff'd mem., 241 App. Div.
757, 270 N.Y.S. 968 (1934), "Insuring a title necessarily involves the de-
termination whether, as a matter of law, it is insurable." Accord, Coop-
erman v. West Coast Title Co., 75 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 1954); Georgia Bar
Ass'n v. Lawyers Title Ins. Co., 222 Ga. 657, 151 S.E.2d 718 (1966); New
Jersey State Bar Ass'n v. Northern N.J. Mortgage Associates, 32 N.J. 430,
161 A.2d 257 (1960), modified, 34 N.J. 301, 169 A.2d 150 (1961); People
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ditional assumption that title insurance companies may make in-
dependent searches of the titles they insure and may rely upon
the opinions of their own salaried employees is the result of his-
torical accident and is not supported by authority binding on the
courts. The entire question can, therefore, be considered anew.
1. State Authority to Permit Illegal Practice of Law
The argument that corporate title examination is a lawful
enterprise sanctioned by statute is most easily disposed of. In
those few states, such as New York and Pennsylvania, where the
doctrine of legislative supremacy prevails or conveyancing is not
held to be the practice of law it is difficult to deny that the
legislature can authorize corporations to engage in title practice.
Elsewhere, however, any such legislative effort is a nullity.49
Legislatures can authorize title companies to engage in the insur-
ance business, and so long as the companies do nothing but in-
sure, their business is a legitimate one. But permission to insure
does not mean that the company may, under the guise of such
activity, illegally practice law. This same essential question has
arisen where casualty companies have unsuccessfully attempted
to appear before workmen's compensation boards.50 As was said
in People v. Title Guarantee & Trust Company,51 whether a lay-
man is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law "is to be de-
cided by the nature of the act, and not by the identity of the indi-
vidual who most frequently performs it."
2. Estoppel Theory
The second contention-that even if the courts should have
v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 191 App. Div. 165, 181 N.Y.S. 52, affd mem.,
230 N.Y. 578, 130 N.E. 901 (1920) (the title company making its own
examinations by virtue of a New York statute); Bar Ass'n v. Union
Planters Title Guar. Co., 46 Tenn. App. 100, 326 S.W.2d 767 (1959), noted
in 22 UNAUTHOR=ZED PRACTICE NEWS 56 (No. 3, 1956); cf. Hager v. Louis-
ville Title Co., 27 Ky. Rep. 345, 85 S.W. 182 (1905); Hager v. Kentucky
Title Co., 119 Ky. 850, 85 S.W. 183 (1905). It is notable that in Ehmer
v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 156 N.Y. 10, 50 N.E. 420 (1898), the New York
Court of Appeals recognized that in making a search the title company
was performing the same duties as an attorney.
49. Payne, supra note 1. The reliance on New York cases in states
where the doctrine of judicial supremacy has been expressed in its
strongest form is an anomaly difficult to explain. See, e.g., Judd v.
City Trust & Savings Bank, 133 Ohio St. 81, 12 N.E.2d 288 (1937).
50. E.g., Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Jones, 344 Mo. 932, 130 S.W.2d
945 (1939); State ex rel. Daniel v. Wells, 191 S.C. 468, 5 S.E.2d 181
(1939).
51. 227 N.Y. 366, 125 N.E. 666 (1919), motion for reargument de-
nied, 228 N. Y. 585, 127 N.E. 919 (1920).
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originally confined title companies to the issuance of pure insur-
ance, long tolerance now estops judicial intervention-ignores the
well-settled doctrine that estoppel does not run against the sover-
eign even when custom is alleged.5 2 Where the act is not author-
ized by the corporate charter, the rule has been correctly stated
by Fletcher:
The fact that it has been the custom of a corporation to enter
into transactions which are not authorized by its charter cannot
render such transactions any the less ultra vires. "The usage of
a corporation does not become the law of its existence, or the
measure of its powers. The general law of the state (speaking
of a corporation organized under a general law), of which all
persons are presumed to have knowledge, is the source and limit
of all its powers and duties; these cannot be varied either by
usage or contract."53
Since a state cannot, either by charter or statute, authorize a
corporation to engage in the practice of law, an attempt to prac-
tice is ultra vires and can not be defended on grounds of custom.
As the Rhode Island Supreme Court stated with regard to un-
authorized practice, "[m] ere length of time does not and cannot
convert into a legal act what is illegal."54  The Arizona and
Washington courts, in dealing with the activities of real estate
agents and title insurance companies, have disposed of the estop-
pel theory more picturesquely, by stating that it is tantamount to
saying "we have been driving through red lights for so many
years without serious mishap that it is now lawful to do so."5
52. E.g., Maddox v. Hunt, 202 So. 2d 543 (Ala. 1967).
53. FLETCHER, supra note 8, at § 2495.
54. Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Automobile Service Ass'n, 55 R.I.
122, 179 A. 139 (1935).
55. State v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 90 Ariz. 76, 366 P.2d 1
(1961), modified on. rehearing, 91 Ariz. 293, 371 P.2d 1020 (1962); In re
Droker, 59 Wash. 2d 707, 370 P.2d 242 (1962); accord, Chicago Bar
Ass'n v. Quinlan & Tyson, Inc., 53 Ill. App. 2d 388, 203 N.E.2d 131 (1964),
modified on other grounds, 34 ill. 2d 116, 214 N.E.2d 771 (1966); S.
Stern, Henry & Co. v. McDermott, 38 Misc. 2d 50, 236 N.Y.S.2d 778
(Sup. Ct. 1962), aff'd mem., 245 N.Y.S.2d 348 (App. Div. 1963); cf. Darby
v. Mississippi State Bd. of Bar Admissions, 185 So. 2d 684 (Miss. 1966).
This is true even where a defendant may have operated for many years
under a statute now declared unconstitutional. Liebtag v. Dilworth, 25
Pa. D. & C.2d 221 (1961). Mere expediency does not justify a violation
of law. Hexter Title & Abstract Co. v. Grievance Comm., 142 Tex. 506,
179 S.W.2d 946 (1944).
Although these general doctrines are unquestioned, they have, for
practical purposes, been modified in two respects. In some jurisdictions
custom has been considered, not to answer the question whether an
estoppel has been created, but to assist the court in finding whether the
activities in question constitute the unauthorized practice of law. E.g.,
Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 52 N.E.2d 27 (1943); Pioneer
Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. State Bar, 74 Nev. 186, 326 P.2d 408 (1958);
Auerbacher v. Wood, 139 N.J. Eq. 599, 53 A.2d 800 (1947), aff'd, 142
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3. The Right of an Insurer to Examine the Risk
We now come to the argument that the examination of title
by local title companies is not the practice of law because, as in-
surers, they are entitled to examine the risk which they are as-
suming.5 16 Indeed, it would appear that, except in the legislative
supremacy states, the validity of the whole local title insurance
business must stand or fall on the basis of this contention.
An examination of this conventional hypothesis should begin
with the understanding that it is easy to become word-bound by
the term "insurance," since the expression carries strong implica-
tions of legality and utility. Even its most fervid proponents
grant that title insurance differs radically from other conven-
tional forms of insurance. As stated by Roberts:
It has been axiomatic today to observe that title insurance ends
at the point that other forms of insurance begin. Thus, a New
York court in 1903 observed [quoting from Trenton Potteries
Company v. Title Guaranty & Trust Company, 176 N.Y. 65, 68
N.E. 132 (1903)]: "The risks of title insurance end where the
risks of other kinds begin. Title insurance, instead of protecting
the insured against matters that may arise during a stated per-
iod after the issuance of the policy, is designed to save him harm-
less from any loss through defects, liens or encumbrances that
may affect or burden his title when he takes it. It must follow
as a general rule, therefore, that when the insured gets a good
title the covenant of the insurer has been fulfilled and there is
no liability."
In a sense, title insurance is somewhat analogous to boiler
insurance, the primary purpose of both forms of insurance being
the elimination of risk and the avoidance of loss. Neither form
of insurance is based upon mere guesswork. Both of them in-
volve reports evaluating the risk prepared by skilled tech-
nicians. 57
N.J. Eq. 484, 59 A.2d 863 (1948); People v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 191
App. Div. 165, 181 N.Y.S. 52, afi'd mem., 230 N.Y. 578, 130 N.E. 901
(1920); Oregon State Bar v. Security Escrows, Inc., 233 Ore. 80, 377
P.2d 334 (1962); cf. State v. Indiana Real Estate Ass'n, 244 Ind. 214, 191
N.E.2d 711 (1963); State v. Dinger, 14 Wis. 2d 193, 109 N.W.2d 685
(1961). In several other cases where unauthorized practice has been
admitted, custom has been considered in determining whether the
court will exercise its discretionary equitable jurisdiction where an
injunction has been requested. Creekmore v. Izard, 236 Ark. 558, 367
S.W.2d 419 (1963); Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n,
135 Colo. 398, 312 P.2d 998 (1957); State v. Dinger, supra. See also
dissenting opinion in Keyes Co. v. Dade County Bar Ass'n, 46 So. 2d 605
(Fla. 1950).
56. JONSTONE & HOPSON, supra note 5, at 183. In Cooperman v.
West Coast Title Co., 75 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 1954), after pointing out that
all the company was doing was investigating the risk it was undertaking,
the court said, ".... for to practice law one must have a client and in
such instances their clients are themselves."
57. ROBERTS, supra note 30, at 4-5.
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To put the matter somewhat differently, in the case of conven-
tional insurance the insurer assumes that a certain future harm
may occur to any one of several assureds. There is no way of
foretelling the particular person upon whom the harm will fall,
but the risk is spread by charging each assured a premium based
on his proportionate share of the total anticipated loss. In title
insurance, the insurer is concerned with past events affecting a
particular title. In the face of these events an assertion is made
as to an existing fact, that is, the present rather than future con-
dition of the title. 58 This assertion names and generally exempts
from coverage the very risks against which it is supposed to in-
sure. It is based upon an inspection by a "skilled technician," a
person trained in the law of real property. The certificate issued
on the basis of this inspection is not only a guaranty but an as-
sertion of legal judgment. Unlike the conventional self-represen-
tation case where, for example, a corporation is itself purchasing
property, this representation is not made for the benefit of the
company. The intention is that it be relied upon by the assured.59
58. E.g., Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 61 Cal.
App. 232, 214 P. 667 (1923); Booth v. New Jersey Highway Authority,
60 N.J. Super. 534, 159 A.2d 460 (1960); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. V.
Union Trust Co., 283 N.Y. 33, 27 N.E.2d 225 (1940); Foehrenbach v.
German-American Title & Trust Co., 217 Pa. 331, 66 A. 561 (1907). In
the St. Louis, Missouri area, title companies in fact issue two types
of assurance, one a title insurance policy and the other a "certificate of
title." Of the latter, it is said that "[i]n other localities an abstract and
opinion takes the place of a certificate" and that it "protects its holder
only against unexpected encumbrances or defects shown of record, and
not against any encumbrances or defects that are not shown of record."
1 M. GILL, TREATISE ON REAL PROPERTY LAW IN MIssoURi 177 passim (1949).
See also HOUSING & HomE FINAxcE AGENCY, LOAN CLOSING COSTS ON
SINGLE FAMILY HOMES 11 (1965) [hereinafter cited as LoAN CLOSING
COSTS]. A title insurance executive, while admitting that a title -policy
is, in effect, similar to an attorney's opinion, with a guarantee, contends
that it goes beyond that and also "insures" against hidden risks. Lem-
ley, Title Insurance Aspects of Tort Liability, 16 CLEV.-MAI. L. REV. 256
(1967).
59. The element of reliance upon legal judgment has been strongly
stressed in several unauthorized practice cases. State Bar v. Arizona
Land Title & Trust Co., 90 Ariz. 76, 366 P.2d 1 (1961); Kentucky State
Bar Ass'n v. First Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n, 342 S.W.2d 397 (Ky.
1961); Pioneer Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. State Bar, 74 Nev. 186, 326 P.2d
408 (1958); cf. Maggio v. Abstract Title & Mortgage Corp., 277 App.
Div. 940, 98 N.Y.S.2d 1011 (1950). Carter has suggested that the differ-
ence between a title policy based on "insurability" and a lawyer's title
opinion based on "marketability" can be "based only on distinctions
that have little if any substance." Carter, Proposed Legislation Further
Regulating Title Insuring, 39 FLA. B.J. 36, 41 (1965). The same con-
clusion was reached in Lewis, Corporate Capacity to Practice Law-A
Study in Legal Hocus Pocus, 2 IV. L. REv. 342, 348-49 (1938).
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Whether the potential purchaser or mortgagee of land will com-
plete the contemplated transaction depends upon what the policy
indicates about the state of the title. Thus, the policy has no
other purpose than to induce action by the person to whom it is
issued. As Justice Cardozo said in Glanzer v. Shepard regarding
a public weigher's certificates obtained by the seller but relied
upon by the purchaser:
The plaintiffs' use of the certificates was not an indirect or col-
lateral consequence of the action of the weighers. It was a con-
sequence which, to the weighers' knowledge, was the end and
aim of the transaction.60
The contention that a local title insurance company issuing
policies of insurance based on its own examination of title is
doing more than merely evaluating a risk to be assumed is sup-
ported by the recent case of Kentucky State Bar Association v.
First Federal Savings and Loan Association.6 1 In that case when
the defendant lending institution made loans on real estate it
charged a "service" fee covering, inter alia, the cost of title exam-
ination. The examination was made by a salaried employee at-
torney. When charged with unauthorized practice the defendant
contended that it was acting merely in its own behalf and that it
came within the rule of self-representation. In rejecting this
argument the court said:
It is apparent that the title examination is not made exclusively
for the benefit of respondent. A clear title is one of the condi-
tions upon which it will make a loan. The examination is made
primarily for the benefit of the borrower so that he can comply
with this essential condition. The fact that a charge is made to
the borrower for this service, if such a charge is made, simply
confirms the fact that the legal service is being rendered for him.
The court further pointed out that the defendant profited by the
transaction, that there was a complete lack of professional rela-
tion between the borrower and the defendant's attorney, and
that there was no question but that:
a "title examination" (which includes an analysis of recorded
interests in land coupled with an opinion as to its legal status)
is a service which lawfully can be performed for others only by
a licensed attorney.
The Court continued in a somewhat obscure dictum:
Even when a company is engaged in the title insurance business,
it cannot sell to the public, though a relatively insignificant part
of the transaction, the legal services of its own salaried attor-
ney.62
60. 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
61. 342 S.W.2d 397 (Ky. 1961).
62. Similarly, it was found that a corporate trustee was not
simply acting on its own behalf but was performing legal services for
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When we extricate ourselves from the verbal trap created
by the word "insurance" and admit that a title policy is merely
an opinion of title6 3 backed by a warranty and relied upon by
persons outside the insuring company, some curious contradic-
tions appear. For example, in Land Title Abstract & Trust
Company v. Dworken it was held that the defendant could issue
title insurance policies but could not furnish
opinions in statements of title and/or certificates of title, and
otherwise, as to the condition of the title to real estate, when
defendant does not insure or guarantee such title or the validity
and due execution of securities prepared by it.64
The same rule was followed in Steer v. Land Title Guarantee &
Trust Company,65 a widely cited and relied upon case from the
Common Pleas, which assumed throughout that the defendant
could engage in the title insurance business but could not sell
"title opinions." The court stated:
This court ... is ... of the opinion that a salaried lawyer for a
title company may render an opinion to his own corporate prin-
cipal without being guilty of unauthorized practice of law; but
when the corporate principal "sells" that opinion, legal in nature,
to an outsider, that corporate principal is guilty of illegally prac-
ticing law. We feel quite strongly that the corporate principal
is still guilty of unauthorized practice of law by making such a
"sale" of a legal opinion to a third party even though that legal
opinion was prepared for it by its salaried lawyer, directly in the
course of the corporate principal's own legitimate business activ-
ities. The vice in the equation comes from "sale," for a consider-
ation, to an outsider. It is, as we view it, a clear duty of the cor-
the cestui. State Bar Ass'n v. Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d
863 (1958).
63. It is universally held that the giving of title opinions consti-
tutes the practice of law. E.g., People v. Hanna, 127 Colo. 481, 258 P.2d
492 (1953); Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623
(1941); Florida Bar v. McPhee, 195 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 1967); Boykin v.
Hopkins, 174 Ga. 511, 162 S.E. 796 (1932); People V. Peoples' Stock
Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176 N.E. 901 (1931); Kentucky State Bar
Ass'n v. First Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n, 342 S.W.2d 397 (Ky. 1961);
Grand Rapids Bar Ass'n v. Denkema, 290 Mich. 56, 287 N.W. 377 (1939);
Darby v. Mississippi Board of Bar Admissions, 185 So. 2d 684 (Miss.
1966); Hulse v. Criger, 363 Mo. 26, 247 S.W.2d 855 (1952); Land Title
Abstract & Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650 (1934);
Union City & Obion County Bar Ass'n v. Waddell, 205 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn.
App. 1947); Hexter Title & Abstract Co. v. Grievance Comm., 142 Tex.
506, 179 S.W.2d 946 (1944); State ex rel. State Bar v. Cunningham-
Nield Realty, Inc., 25 UNAUTHORIZED PRACTIcE NEWS 306 (Wis. Cir. Ct.
1960); cf. In re Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass. 607, 194 N.E. 313
(1935); Ferris v. Snively, 172 Wash. 167, 19 P.2d 942 (1933). But see
note 58 supra as to St. Louis practice. See generally Annots., 151 A.L.R.
781 (1944), 125 A.L.R. 1173 (1940), 111 A.L.R. 19 (1937).
64. 129 Ohio St. at 25, 193 N.E. at 651.
65. 113 N.E.2d 763 (Ohio C.P. 1953); cf. Judd v. City Trust &
Savings Bank, 133 Ohio St. 81, 12 N.E.2d 288 (1937).
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porate principal to keep the legal opinions prepared by its sal-
aried employees to itself. The outsiders should quite clearly
under the Ohio Supreme Court decisions in the Dworken and
Judd cases ... obtain their own legal opinions from lawyers
of their own choosing. Parenthetically, it might well be ob-
served that, if such outsiders so desire, they could have their own
salaried lawyers prepare legal opinions for them without the
violation of any unauthorized practice of law rules. It is only
when the legal opinions of captive, salaried lawyers become, in
effect, the subject of barter on the market place by the cor-
porate principals of such captive lawyers that we have the type
of illegal, unauthorized practice of law by the corporations
which has been so consistently condemned by the Supreme Court
of Ohio in the past.
The rule that the sale of a title policy based on the opinion of
a title company's legal staff is not the "subject of barter in the
market place" but a legitimate lay function, is not confined to
Ohio. In the New Jersey Mortgage Associates6 6 case, it was
held initially that the defendant abstract company could not pass
on title; but later, when the abstract company was converted
into a title insurance corporation, no question as to the validity
of its insuring activities seems to have been raised and only
ancillary activities were enjoined.
The cases dealing with an abstract company acting as the
representative of a title insurance company show similar con-
fusion. In Beach Abstract & Guaranty Company v. Bar Associa-
tion67 it was held that where the agent abstract company exam-
ined the title it was illegally practicing law, although the deci-
sion tacitly assumes that the same function could be carried out
by the principal title insurance company. Florida cases reach
the result that an abstract company may examine title for the
title insurance company but "may not render, orally or in writ-
ing, opinions concerning the status of marketability of title to
real property."6 8 It has further been held that a title insurance
company is illegally practicing law when it gives opinions of title
where no bona fide application for insurance has been made.60
66. New Jersey State Bar Ass'n v. Northern N.J. Mortgage Associ-
ates, 22 N.J. 184, 123 A.2d 498 (1956); 55 N.J. Super. 230, 150 A.2d 496
(Ch. 1959); 32 N.J. 430, 161 A.2d 257 (1960); 34 N.J. 301, 169 A.2d 150
(1961).
67. 230 Ark. 494, 326 S.W.2d 900 (1959).
68. Florida Bar v. McPhee, 195 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 1967); Cooperman
v. West Coast Title Co., 75 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 1954); cf. Florida Bar v.
Columbia Title, 197 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1967). But see Florida Bar Com-
mences Action Against Out-of-State Lawyer and Insurer, 32 UNAUTHOR-
IZED PRACTICE NEws 88 (No. 1, 1966).
69. In re National Title Co., (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1935) in G. BRAND, UN-
AUTHORIZED PRACTICE DECISIONS 438 (1937); accord, Title Ins. & Trust Co.
v. Los Angeles, 61 Cal. App. 232, 214 P. 667 (1923).
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Nor can a title insurance company issue commitment papers
indicating an opinion as to the validity of title where there has
been no bona fide application for insurance.70 The Texas agency
cases are similarly unsatisfactory when considering the relative
rights of agent and the insurer. They deal specifically with ab-
stract companies which have performed all or virtually all of the
services required in the closing of title transactions, and hold that
the abstract company may not give an opinion even though it is
assumed that it is entirely legitimate for the title insurance
company to do so. 7 1
When the central issue is other than unauthorized practice
of law, the courts show a much greater readiness to admit that
title insurance companies are, in fact, practicing law. For ex-
ample, in Inter-County Title Guaranty & Mortgage Company v.
Rasquin,72 the defendant title company had simply examined
titles for the HOLC without guarantee. This was the principal
activity of the company, and it was held to be legal work. As a
consequence, the company was not an insurance company within
the terms of the Internal Revenue Act. Similarly the courts have
frequently distinguished between insuring activities and title
examination aspects of conveyancing in cases where litigants
have sought to hold insurance companies liable for negligently
performing the latter.73 When liability has been imposed it has
70. Title Companies Can Not Give Opinions of Title, Florida
Court Holds, 2 UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE NEWS 1 (1936).
71. Alamo Title Co. v. San Antonio Bar Ass'n, 360 S.W.2d 814
(Tex. Civ. App. 1962); San Antonio Bar Ass'n v. Guardian Abstract &
Title Co., 156 Tex. 7, 291 S.W.2d 697 (1956); Hexter Title & Abstract
Co. v. Grievance Comm., 142 Tex. 506, 179 S.W.2d 946 (1944); Stewart
Abstract Co. v. Judicial Comm'n, 131 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
In Virginia, although there is no reported case in point, the Bar
Association's Committee on Unauthorized Practice has ruled that, al-
though an abstract company may act as the agent for a title insurance
company, it may not express an opinion as to title. Virginia Committee
Holds Lawyers in Abstract Business Can Not Give Legal Advice, 12
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE NEWS 7 (1946). The same result has been
reached in Minnesota by agreement between the bar and at least one
abstract company. St. Paul Title Company Enters into Agreement, 5
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE NEWS 71 (1939).
72. 38 F. Supp. 735 (E.D.N.Y. 1941).
73. E.g., Viotti v. Giomi, 230 Cal. App. 2d 730, 41 Cal. Reptr. 345
(1964); Hawkins v. Oakland Title Ins. & Guar. Co., 165 Cal. App. 2d
116, 331 P.2d 742 (1958); J.H. Trisdale, Inc. v. Shasta County Title Co.,
146 Cal. App. 2d 831, 304 P.2d 832 (1956); Bridgeport Airport, Inc. v.
Title Guar. & Trust Co., 111 Conn. 537, 150 A. 509 (1930); Doonis v.
Mutual Title Co., 196 A.2d 480 (D.C. Ct. App. 1964); Kentucky Title Co.
v. Hail, 219 Ky. 256, 292 S.W. 817 (1927); Corcoran v. Abstract & Title
Co., 217 Md. 633, 143 A.2d 808 (1958); Dorr v. Mass. Title Ins. Co., 238
Mass. 490, 131 N.E. 191 (1921); Sandler v. New Jersey Realty Title Ins.
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been said that the company must be held to the same standard as
an attorney.
It would appear, therefore, that if title insurance were being
considered as a new enterprise, there would be strong logic
supporting the contention that the local companies are illegally
practicing law. A specific holding supporting such logic might
even now be expected in jurisdictions where local title insur-
ance has not become generally accepted. In those areas where
this form of title assurance has become conventional, however, to
outlaw it completely might result in serious economic repercus-
sions. Such a possibility will be treated later in this article. For
present purposes it is sufficient to say that, when faced with a
decision, the courts may decide to make an exception to the
unauthorized practice rule. But in doing so they should recog-
nize that an exception has been made, and that such limitations
as the courts deem expedient may be established.
C. Tim LEGALITY OF ANCILLARY ACTIVITIES
In localities where title companies habitually examine the
titles they insure, their activities may not extend beyond that
point. But in addition to this principal work of examining and
insuring, they may perform a number of ancillary services which
may or may not be characterized as practicing law.
1. Drafting Documents and Giving Advice
The most obvious ancillary service is the drafting of deeds,
Co., 66 N.J. Super. 597, 169 A.2d 735 (L. Div. 1961); Colegrove v. Behrle,
63 N.J. Super. 356, 164 A.2d 620 (App. Div. 1960); Economy Bldg.
& Loan Ass'n v. West Jersey Title & Guar. Co., 64 N.J.L. 27, 44 A. 854
(1899); Maggio v. Abstract Title & Mortgage Corp., 277 App. Div. 940,
98 N.Y.S.2d 1011 (1950); Hadley Realty Corp. v. Lawyers Title Corp.,
37 N.Y.S.2d 658 (N.Y. City Ct. 1942); Lyons Holding Corp. v. Home
Title Ins. Co., 250 App. Div. 640, 295 N.Y.S. 161 (1937); Sunset Holding
Corp. v. Home Title Ins. Co., 242 App. Div. 699, 272 N.Y.S. 870 (1934),
sub appeal, 172 Misc. 759, 16 N.Y.S.2d 273 (N.Y. City Ct. 1939); Dokel v.
Title Guar. & Trust Co., 147 Misc. 72, 263 N.Y.S. 438 (N.Y. City Ct.
1933); Trenton Potteries Co. v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 176 N.Y.
65, 68 N.E. 132 (1903); Ehmer v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 156 N.Y. 10,
50 N.E. 420 (1898); Henkels v. Philadelphia Title Ins. Co., 177 Pa. Super.
110, 110 A.2d 878 (1955); Bodine v. Wayne Title & Trust Co., 33 Pa.
Super. 68 (1907); Gauler v. Solicitors' Loan & Trust Co., 9 Pa. Co. Rep.
634 (1891); cf. Renkert v. Title Guar. Trust Co., 102 Mo. App. 267, 76
S.W. 641 (1903); Udell v. City Title Ins. Co., 12 App. Div. 2d 78, 208
N.Y.S.2d 504 (1960); Empire Dev. Co. v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 225
N.Y. 53, 121 N.E. 468 (1918); Sperling v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 227
App. Div. 5, 236 N.Y.S. 553 (1929), affd inem., 252 N.Y. 613, 170 N.E. 163
(1930). See generally Note, Title Insurance: The Duty to Search, 71
YALE L.J. 1161 (1962).
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mortgages, and other instruments which constitute the legal
means in which the transfer takes place. The general rule is that
such drafting constitutes the practice of law.74 The same is true
regarding advice as to the legal effect of the transaction. 5
Some courts have created an exception to these rules. Al-
though the exception has been rejected by some, has not been
uniformly applied, and is too vague to constitute an adequate
guide for prediction of future court action, it must be considered
in any systematic examination of doctrine. The exception is that
a layman may perform legal services which are merely "inci-
dental" to other permitted activity. 6  When the "incidental-to-
other-work" theory has been raised in drafting cases, a variety
of holdings has been the result. But, broadly speaking, two ap-
proaches have been employed. Some courts have permitted sim-
ple drafting incidental to what is otherwise lay work,7 7 while
74. Although the expressions "conveyancing" and "conveyances" do
not have clearly defined legal meaning and are used loosely by the
courts, it is almost universally held that conveyancing is legal work and,
as such, cannot be carried out by laymen or corporations. E.g., In re
Mathews, 57 Idaho 75, 62 P.2d 578 (1936); Grand Rapids Bar Ass'n v.
Denkema, 290 Mich. 56, 287 N.W. 377 (1939); Darby v. Mississippi Bd.
of Bar Admissions, 185 So. 2d 684 (Miss. 1966); Hulse v. Criger, 363
Mo. 26, 247 S.W.2d 855 (1952); Cape May County Bar Ass'n v. Ludlam,
45 N.J. 121, 211 A.2d 780 (1965); Rattikin Title Co. v. Grievance Comm.,
272 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954); Commonwealth v. Jones & Robins,
186 Va. 30, 41 S.E.2d 720 (1947); Ferris v. Snively, 172 Wash. 167, 19
P.2d 942 (1933).
75. The extent to which traditional rules regarding advice are
modified by evolving theories of freedom of speech and press has not
yet been clearly settled. U1MW v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217
(1967); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar,
377 U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); New York
County Lawyers' Ass'n v. Dacey, 54 Misc. 2d 564, 282 N.Y.S.2d 985,
modified, 28 App. Div. 2d 161, 283 N.Y.S.2d 984, partially stayed, 20
N.Y.2d 939, 233 N.E.2d 462 (1967).
76. The "public convenience" exception is also sometimes used, but
generally in connection with the activities of real estate agents. See
Comment, The Completion of Deed Forms by Real Estate Brokers, 44
MARQ. L. REV. 519 (1961). Thus, it may be more convenient to permit
such agents to prepare contracts of sale since a lawyer may not be
available at the time a contract is signed. The same rationale does not
apply to title company activities, nor it is swallowed up in the larger
"incidental to business" exception.
77. E.g., Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n,
135 Colo. 398, 312 P.2d 998 (1957); Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb, 315
Mass. 176, 52 N.E.2d 27 (1943); State Bar v. Kupris, 366 Mich. 688, 116
N.W.2d 341 (1962); Childs v. Smeltzer, 315 Pa. 9, 171 A. 883 (1934);
Bar Ass'n v. Union Planters Title Guar. Co., 46 Tenn. App. 100, 326
S.W.2d 767 (1959); State v. Dinger, 14 Wis. 2d 193, 109 N.W.2d 685 (1961);
cf. Creekmore v. Izard, 236 Ark. 558, 367 S.W.2d 419 (1963); Common-
wealth v. Jones & Robins, 186 Va. 30, 41 S.E.2d 720 (1947).
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others have denied any such limitation upon the general inhibi-
tion against illegal practice. 8 The confusion created by this
conflict has been compounded by attempts to distinguish be-
tween "simple" instruments, generally on printed forms, and
those which are "complex." Some decisions state that completion
of the former is not the practice of law, often adding the caveat
that there must be no compensation for the draftsman.'9 How-
ever, if any legal judgment is demanded, the act is forbidden to
laymen.80 On the other hand, many courts entirely repudiate
the "simple instrument" rule and hold that even completion of
standard forms is the practice of law.81 These latter cases are
based upon the theory enunciated in Judge Pound's concurring
opinion in People v. Title Guarantee & Trust Company,8 2 that he
was "unable to rest any satisfactory test of the distinction be-
tween simple and complex instruments. The most complex are
simple to the skilled, and the simplest often trouble the inex-
78. E.g., State Bar v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 90 Ariz. 76,
366 P.2d 1 (1961), modified on rehearing, 91 Ariz. 293, 271 P.2d 1020
(1962); Association v. Block, 230 Ark. 430, 323 S.W.2d 912 (1959); Agran
v. Shapiro, 127 Cal. App. 2d 807, 273 P.2d 619 (1954); Grievance Comm.
v. Dacey, 154 Conn. 129, 222 A.2d 339 (1966), appeal dismissed, 386 U.S.
683 (1967); Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Quinlan & Tyson, Inc., 53 Ill. App. 2d
388, 203 N.E.2d 131 (1964), modified on other grounds, 34 Ill. 2d 116, 214
N.E.2d 771 (1966); Pioneer Title Ins. Trust Co. v. State Bar, 74 Nev. 186,
326 P.2d 408 (1958); New Jersey Bar Ass'n v. Northern N.J. Mortgage
Associates, 32 N.J. 430, 161 A.2d 257 (1960), modified, 34 N.J. 301, 169
A.2d 150 (1961).
79. E.g., In re Mathews, 58 Idaho 772, 79 P.2d 535 (1938); State v.
Indiana Real Estate Ass'n, 244 Ind. 214, 191 N.E.2d 711 (1963); Lowell
Bar Ass'n v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 52 N.E.2d 27 (1943); Cain v. Merchants
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 66 N.D. 746, 268 N.W. 719 (1936); Goodman v.
Beall, 130 Ohio St. 427, 200 N.E. 470 (1936); State v. Dinger, 14 Wis. 2d
193, 109 N.W.2d 685 (1961).
80. E.g., People v. Sipper, 61 Cal. App. 2d 844, 142 P.2d 960 (1943);
Grievance Comm. v. Dacey, 154 Conn. 129, 222 A.2d 339 (1966); State
Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863
(1958); Pioneer Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. State Bar, 74 Nev. 186, 326 P.2d
408 (1958); Crawford v. McConnell, 173 Okla. 520, 49 P.2d 551 (1935);
Commonwealth v. Jones & Robins, 186 Ira. 30, 41 S.E.2d 720 (1947).
81. E.g., Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Quinlan & Tyson, Inc., 53 Ill. App.
2d 388, 203 N.E.2d 131 (1964), modified on appeal, 34 Ill. 2d 116, 214
N.E.2d 771 (1966); People v. Lawyers Title Corp., 282 N.Y. 513, 27
N.E.2d 30 (1940); Martineau v. Gressner 182 N.E.2d 48 (Ohio C.P. 1962);
Hexter Title & Abstract Co. v. Grievance Comm., 142 Tex. 506, 179 S.W.
2d 946 (1944). In People v. Schaefer, 404 Ill. 45, 87 N.E.2d 773 (1949),
the court, speaking of the simple docmnent test, pithily disposed of it
by saying, "[I]f his service does not amount to the practice of law it is
without material value; but if it is of material value it would likely
amount to the practice of law."
82. 227 N.Y. 366, 125 N.E. 666 (1919).
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perienced."83
The "incidental-to-other-work" exception is apparently more
freely admitted when applied to drafting than when applied to
advice. While it is true that advice depending primarily upon
non-legal factors may be furnished by laymen, 4 if predicated
primarily upon legal judgment it may not be given even when
incidental to work of a non-legal nature.8 5 This rule has some-
times been extended to drafting on the ground that it is "quasi-
counseling."80
In addition to this general exception, other factors may be
relevant in determining whether a layman is engaged in unauth-
orized practice. Whether he has received compensation is some-
times material, '8 7 but remuneration may not be necessary for the
specific act alleged in violation of the law.88 Also, courts have
83. Accord, Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Quinlan & Tyson, Inc., 53 Ill.
App. 2d 388, 203 N.E.2d 131 (1964), modified on other grounds, 34 Ill. 2d
116, 214 N.E.2d 777 (1966); Gardner v. Conway, 234 Minn. 468, 48
N.W.2d 788 (1951); New Jersey State Bar Ass'n v. Northern N.J.
Mortgage Associates, 32 N.J. 430, 161 A.2d 257 (1960), modified, 34 N.J.
301, 169 A.2d 150 (1961); Oregon State Bar v. Security Escrows, Inc.,
233 Ore. 80, 377 P.2d 334 (1962); Hexter Title & Abstract Co., Inc. v.
Grievance Comm., 142 Tex. 506, 179 S.W.2d 946 (1944); Washington
State Bar Ass'n v. Washington Ass'n of Realtors, 41 Wash. 2d 697, 251
P.2d 619 (1952). In a somewhat different context it has been pointed
out that
[t]he one necessary societal function of the lawyer-the reason
why it is necessary to license lawyers and to demand that all
entrants to the profession pass a bar examination-is that the
lawyer writes enforceable contracts. Communal life in a mod-
ern society rests upon pieces of paper that tell people their
rights, privileges, powers and immunities, duties, liabilities and
disabilities. When challenged, these pieces of paper-wills,
trust agreements, mortgages, deeds, certificates of incorpora-
tion, leases, agreements to purchase or to sell, warrants and so
forth-must stand up. The lawyer assures that they will.
M. MAYE, THE LAWYERS 42 (1967).
84. E.g., State v. Childe, 139 Neb. 91, 295 N.W. 381 (1941); Auer-
bacher v. Wood, 139 N.J. Eq. 599, 53 A.2d 800 (1947), affd, 142 N.J. Eq.
484, 59 A.2d 863 (1948); Oregon State Bar v. John H. Miller & Co., 235
Ore. 341, 385 P.2d 181 (1963).
85. See, e.g., cases cited note 78 supra.
86. E.g., State Bar v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 90 Ariz. 76,
366 P.2d 1 (1961), modified on rehearing, 91 Ariz. 293, 371 P.2d 1020
(1962); Washington State Bar Ass'n v. Washington Ass'n of Realtors,
41 Wash. 2d 697, 251 P.2d 619 (1952). See also Comment, supra note 76.
87. E.g., Fink v. Peden, 214 Ind. 584, 17 N.E.2d 95 (1938); Bump v.
District Court, 232 Iowa 623, 5 N.W.2d 914 (1942); Fitchette v. Taylor, 191
Minn. 582, 254 N.W. 910 (1934); Hulse v. Criger, 363 Mo. 26, 247 S.W.2d
855 (1952); Cain v. Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 66 N.D. 746, 268
N.W. 719 (1936); Haverty Furniture Co. v. Foust, 174 Tenn. 203, 124
S.W.2d 694 (1939); State ex rel. Junior Ass'n of Milwaukee Bar v. Rice,
236 Wis. 38, 294 N.W. 550 (1940).
88. E.g., Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Quinlan & Tyson, 53 Ill. App. 2d 388,
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been quick to reject the contention that the services are free
when, in fact, they constitute a "leader" for other compensated
work.8 9 As was said in Grievance Committee v. Dacey,90 the
work is not "done as a favor to a friend." Moreover, it has been
pointed out by way of dictum in the same case that the public
may be in greater danger from strictly free services than from
those for which compensation is given.
2. Curative Action
In addition to giving advice and drafting, a title insurance
company may, where title is found to be defective, attempt to
take curative action-another "ancillary service." Such action,
when called to the attention of the courts, is universally declared
to be the practice of law."'
3. Escrow and Closing Services
Although it is common knowledge that escrow and closing
services are frequently furnished by title insurance companies,
institutional lenders, and other lay bodies, the exact extent to
which this practice is sanctioned by the courts is uncertain. In
the first place, when the practice has been enjoined it has gen-
erally come within the scope of transactions by which laymen
203 N.E.2d 131 (1964), modified on other grounds, 34 Ill. 2d 116, 214
N.E.2d 771 (1966); Darby v. Mississippi Bd. of Bar Admissions, 185 So.
2d 684 (Miss. 1966); Clark v. Reardon, 104 S.W.2d 407 (Kan. City. Ct.
App. 1937); Pioneer Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. State Bar, 74 Nev. 186,
326 P.2d 408 (1958); In re Baker, 8 N.J. 321, 85 A.2d 505 (1951);
Grievance Comm. v. Coryell, 190 S.W.2d 130 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
89. E.g., Grievance Comm. v. Dacey, 154 Conn. 129, 222 A.2d 339(1966); Rosenthal v. Shepard Broadcasting Serv., Inc., 299 Mass. 286,
12 N.E.2d 819 (1938); State v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 335 Mo. 845,
74 S.W.2d 348 (1934); New Jersey State Bar Ass'n v. Northern N.J.
Mortgage Associates, 32 N.J. 430, 161 A.2d 257 (1960), modified in
part, 34 N.J. 301, 169 A.2d 150 (1961); People v. People's Trust Co.,
180 App. Div. 494, 167 N.Y.S. 767 (1917); Cain v. Merchants Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co., 66 N.D. 746, 268 N.W. 719 (1936); Green v. Huntington
Nat'l Bank, 3 Ohio App. 2d 62, 209 N.E.2d 228 (1964), aff'd, 4 Ohio St.
2d 78, 212 N.E.2d 585 (1965); Hexter Title & Abstract Co. v. Grievance
Comm., 142 Tex. 506, 179 S.W.2d 946 (1944).
90. 154 Conn. 129, 222 A.2d 339 (1966).
91. E.g., State Bar v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 90 Ariz. 76,
366 P.2d 1 (1961), modified on rehearing, 91 Ariz. 293, 371 P.2d 1020(1962); Beach Abrstact & Guar. Co. v. Bar Ass'n, 230 Ark. 494, 326
S.W.2d 900 (1959); Title Guar. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo. 423,
312 P.2d 1011 (1957); Keyes Co. v. Dade County Bar Ass'n, 46 So. 2d 605(Fla. 1950); People v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,
176 N.E. 901 (1931); Hexter Title & Abstract Co. v. Grievance Comm.,
142 Tex. 506, 179 S.W.2d 946 (1944).
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have taken over the entire conveyancing process.9 2 Secondly,
the terms "closing" and "escrow" themselves are so flexible as
to embrace a great variety of practices about which we have
little or no precise information. The closing is, in general terms,
the completion of the transaction. After the preliminary con-
tract has been signed, the title examined, and the necessary
documents prepared, the parties must be brought together, the
documents executed, delivered, and the funds disbursed. A
proper closing will also embrace up-dating the title and advising
the parties regarding the effect of what they are doing. Al-
though this work is routinely carried out by laymen in many
sections of the country, when it has been brought to the atten-
tion of the courts it has generally been held to constitute the
practice of law. 3
In its simplest form, an escrow has been defined as "a deed
delivered to a stranger to be by him delivered to the grantee upon
the happening of certain conditions, upon which last delivery
the transmission of title is completed." 94 In theory, whether the
escrow holder is practicing law will depend upon the conditions
to be met. If, for example, the sole preliminary to delivery is the
payment of the purchase price, his duties are purely ministerial.
On the other hand, where the escrow holder is to determine the
validity of title, supervise the closing, draft instruments, or the
like, he will in all probability be practicing law. In practice, the
term "escrow" is used indifferently to describe all sorts of
arrangements between the parties,95 and appears to be increas-
ingly employed as the equivalent of complete examination and
92. See notes 100-126 infra and accompanying text.
93. Arkansas Bar Ass'n v. Block, 230 Ark. 430, 323 S.W.2d 912
(1959); Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Quinlan & Tyson, Inc., 53 Ill. App. 2d 388,
203 N.E.2d 131 (1964), modified on other grounds, 34 Ill. 2d 116, 214
N.E.2d 771 (1966); People v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Iln.
462, 176 N.E. 901 (1931); Alamo Title Co. v. San Antonio Bar Ass'n, 360
S.W.2d 814 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962); San Antonio Bar Ass'n v. Guardian
Abstract & Title Co., 156 Tex. 7, 291 S.W.2d 697 (1956). But cf. Kish
v. Bay Counties Title Guar. Co., 62 Cal. Rptr. 494 (Cal. App. 1967);
Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Board of Ins. Comm'rs, 207 S.W.2d 972 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1948). A contrary result was reached in Bar Ass'n v. Union
Planters Title Guar. Co., 46 Tenn. App. 100, 326 S.W.2d 767 (1959), on
the grounds that the closing procedure was ancillary to the defendant's
principal business of examining titles. Closings carried out by title com-
panies where the company issues insurance have been judicially sanc-
tioned in Florida. Florida Bar v. McPhee, 195 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 1967).
94. 1 Bouvixa's LAW DIcTioNARY 1072 (3d rev. 1914). See also 28
Am. JuR. 2d Escrow § 1 (1966).
95. It has been called a "generic term." 30A C.J.S. Escrows § 1
(1965).
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closing service.9 6
There is scant authority as to the validity of particular kinds
of escrows in terms of the illegal practice of law. In at least
some cases escrows of a strictly limited nature have been toler-
ated,97 while more comprehensive escrow service has some-
times been enjoined.98 Where a title insurance company does not
insure, it will not be permitted by way of an escrow to carry out
acts otherwise characterized as the practice of law.99
D. THE "PACKAGE DEAL"
For a number of reasons there is an increasing tendency to-
day for the parties to a title transaction to use a "package deal,"
sometimes referred to as "complete closing service." Function-
ally, these terms imply that after the buyer and seller have
reached a bargain, the entire transaction is placed in the hands
of a layman or corporation to handle all details leading up to
and including the final closing.0 0 This practice has unquestion-
96. Boothe, Escrow Closings and Disbursements, 45 TrTLE NEWS 2
(No. 9, 1966); Escrow-and How It Can Help the Broker, 46 TITLE
NEWS 4 (No. 9, 1967); McKillop, Portrait of a Perfect Escrow, 47 TITLE
NEWS 90 (No. 1, 1968); Newman, Development of an Escrow Department,
47 TITLE NEWS 18 (1968). For an equivocal statement, see ARE1MENT
BETWEEN THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA AND CALIFORNIA LAND TITLE
ASSOCIATION (mimeo. 1936). This agreement has not produced uniform
practice in the state. J. LIEBERMAN, CkIrORNIA REAL ESTATE TRANSAC-
TIONS §§ 14.2, 14.8, 14.9 (1967).
97. State Bar v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 90 Ariz. 76, 366
P.2d 1 (1961), modified on rehearing, 91 Ariz. 293, 371 P.2d 1020 (1962);
Florida Bar v. McPhee, 195 So.2d 552 (Fla. 1967); Pioneer Title Ins. &
Trust Co. v. State Bar, 74 Nev. 186, 326 P.2d 408 (1958); Oregon State
Bar v. Security Escrows, Inc., 233 Ore. 80, 377 P.2d 334 (1962).
98. Beach Abstract & Guar. Co. v. Bar Ass'n, 230 Ark. 494, 326
S.E.2d 900 (1959); Title Guar. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo. 423,
312 P.2d 1011 (1957); In re Droker, 59 Wrash. 2d 707, 370 P.2d 242 (1962).
But cf. State Bar v. Cady, 19 UNAUTHORIZEI PRACTICE NEWS 26 (No. 1,
1953).
99. E.g., Cooperman v. West Coast Title Co., 75 So. 2d 818 (Fla.
1954).
100. Some interesting variations on this type of procedure are now
being experimented with. For example, the Lawyers Title Insurance
Corporation has offered a plan to ordinary companies whereby it will
handle the entire transaction when the employees are forced to give up
their old homes and acquire new ones due to transfers. A Good Man
Nowadays Is Hard to Find, LAwYERS TimE NEWs 2 (July, 1964); Scott,
Title Insurance Firm Handles Legal Red Tape of Relocation, AMERICAN
BANKER, Oct. 10, 1967, at 31A. At least two other companies offer
similar services. In the Realty Business in Spite of Themselves, Busi-
NEss WEEK, Aug. 10, 1963, at 58. In some areas large scale home
builders are offering to "absorb" all closing costs and carry out the
closing themselves. The Wall Street Journal, Aug. 6, 1965, at 14, col. 1.
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ably received widespread de facto toleration, 0 1 although its
practical result is to make conveyancing a lay function. 0 2  In
In another variation, a developer sells houses with the provision that
the mortgage shall be given to a particular lender and closing costs
shall be paid in bulk by the seller. This latter type of transaction has
occasioned the American Bar Association's Standing Committee on
Professional Ethics some uncertainty as to the position of the attorney
employed to carry out the transactions. See Informal Opinions No.
C-472 (Dec. 26, 1961), 886 (Sept. 28, 1965), and 954 (Aug. 8, 1966).
101. Home Title Ins. Co. v. Rinaldi, 81 A.2d 923 (D.C. Mun. Ct.
App. 1951); Practice of Law: Hearing Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the
House Comm. on the District of Columbia, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965);
Fiflis, Land Transfer Improvement, 38 U. COLO. L. REv. 431, 446 (1966);
Jones, Conveyancing in Cleveland, 104 SOL. J. 773 (1960); Real Estate
Brokers Offer Package Deals, 25 UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE NEws 196(1959); Report of the Special Committee on Lawyers' Title Guaranty
Funds, 91 A.B.A. REP. 235 (1966); Report of the Standing Committee
on Unauthorized Practice of the Law, 84 A.B.A. REP. 590 (1959). As
Roberts has said, "In urban centers the title companies began to
take over conveyancing and the whole conveyancing process was
centered in the companies' offices." Roberts, Title Insurance: State
Regulation and the Public Perspective, 39 IND. L.J. 1, 9 (1963). As
illustrative of the services expected of the lender's attorney, the pro-
posed Alabama minimum fee bill, after setting fees for attorneys closing
loans guaranteed by F.H.A. or V.A. or conventional loans which originate
with lenders outside his community or county, provides:
Such fee shall include the drafting of the customary papers,
examining title and securing title insurance (if required), clos-
ing of transaction in the attorney's office, and disbursing the
proceeds. The attorney shall make an additional charge for
drafting deed and shall charge for all curative work pursuant to
all other provisions of the schedule.
In other words, he will carry out the entire transaction-except to give
advice and protection to the buyer-mortgagor.
102. The title insurance companies undoubtedly attempt to play two
roles simultaneously. On the one hand, they insist that they are en-
gaged solely in the title insurance business. Indeed, in their current
attack upon bar-related title guaranty funds, the commercial insurers'
principal argument is that it is improper for the bar to engage in a
business. On the other hand, they stress that their "profession" "encom-
passes the entire field of legal technicalities and complexities which en-
shroud real estate titles." McKillop, Title Insurance is Heady Stuff,
LAWYERS TITLE NEWS 10 (No. 12, 1962). Schmidt, appearing at an
American Bar Association symposium as the representative of the title
insurance industry, contended that title insurance was "a commercial
operation in the insurance field," while at the same time stressing the
high degree of legal skill required in the work. Schmidt, The Lawyer
and Title Insurance, 45 TITLE NEws 14 (No. 10, 1966). Burlingame, a
title insurance executive, speaks of the title insurance "industry" and
the need to "professionalize" in almost the same breath. Burlingame,
Can This Marriage Be Saved?, 47 TITLE NEWS 75 (No. 1, 1968). Title
companies, in training their own employees, have been careful to instruct
them in property law, e.g., M. Gill, LAND TITLE CouRsE (1955); TITLE
INSURANCE AND TRUST Co., HAmDBoOK FOR TITLE MEN (lth ed. 1968);
Land Title Curriculum Developed by Northwood of Texas, 46 TITLE
NEws 18 (No. 9, 1967), and uniformly employ lawyers on their salaried
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the simplest such situation, a real estate broker advertises that he
will take care of the details of completing land transfers which
he has negotiated. Here a quo warranto or similar proceeding
will be successful. 10 3 Somewhat akin to this type of case is one
in which an attorney uses a real estate, mortgage, or escrow
company simply as a "front" to solicit business.0 4 Here it is
possible either to proceed against the attorney for unethical
practice or against the company for unauthorized practice. The
most famous such case was that of In re Rothman0 5 in New
Jersey. Rothman, an attorney, was the alter ego of his real es-
tate and mortgage company and was unquestionably guilty of
gross misconduct in advertising and soliciting business. After he
was formally disciplined he reorganized his operations in such a
fashion as to set in motion the prolonged Northern New Jersey
Mortgage Associates litigation. 0 6 :In the first case reported, it
was found that he had supplemented his mortgage company by
an abstract company and used the paid attorneys of the latter to
complete transactions for the former. After an injunction was
issued, the assets of the abstract company were transferred to a
title insurance corporation and the scope of operations consider-
ably reduced. In subsequent proceedings against the new organ-
ization, the defendants were limited to investigation of title and
drafting of instruments where they themselves were the mort-
gagees. 107
In some cases individual attorneys have used corporations to
carry on unethical practices, but corporate use of the attorney to
engage in unauthorized practice is more common. When this is
staffs. Most recently there has developed a movement supporting for-
mal training schools for persons employed by title companies. Harbert,
The Growing Influence of Title Schools, 47 TrIE NEWS 72 (No. 1, 1968);
Keith, Northwood Institute Offers New Course in Land Title Manage-
ment, 47 TITLE NEWS 2 (No. 3, 1968); Rattikin, Youth Must Also Serve,
47 TITLE NEws 20 (No. 1, 1968); Indiara Launches Land Title Course,
47 TITLE NEws 2 (No. 6, 1968).
103. State ex rel. State Bar v. Cunningham-Nield Realty, Inc., 25
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE NEws 306 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1960).
104. In re Rothman, 12 N.J. 528, 97 A.2d 621 (1953); In re L.R., 7
N.J. 390, 81 A.2d 725 (1951); San Antonio Bar Ass'n v. Guardian Ab-
stract & Title Co., 156 TEx. 7, 291 S.W.2d 667 (1959); In re Droker, 59
Wash. 2d 707, 370 P.2d 242 (1962); see Akron Bar Association Reports on
Real Estate Situation, 23 UNAUTHORIZED PRAcTIcE NEWS 51 (No. 2, 1957).
105. 12 N.J. 528, 97 A.2d 621 (1953).
106. New Jersey State Bar Ass'n v. Northern N.J. Mortgage Associ-
ates, 22 N.J. 184, 123 A.2d 498 (1956); 55 N.J. Super. 230, 150 A.2d 496(Ch. 1959); 32 N.J. 430, 161 A.2d 257 (1960); 34 N.J. 301, 169 A.2d 150
(1961).
107. Accord, Title Guar. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo. 423,
312 P.2d 1011 (1957).
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done, the usual strategy has been to move directly against the
corporation rather than resort to disciplinary proceedings against
its lawyer.108 Thus, in a leading Illinois case 0 9 a bank was en-
108. Counsel employed by a lay corporation may, depending upon
the circumstances, be guilty of unethical practice under any one of the
following A.B.A. Canons of Ethics:
No. 6-Forbidding the representation of conflicting interest
without full disclosure;
No. 27-Forbidding solicitation, direct or indirect;
No. 34-Forbidding the division of fees, except with another law-
yer, based upon a division of service or responsibility;
No. 35-Forbidding the use of lay intermediaries;
No. 38-Forbidding the acceptance of compensation, commission
and rebates without knowledge and consent after full dis-
closure;
No. 47-Forbidding the giving of aid to unauthorized practice.
The cases dealing with unauthorized practice by lay individuals
and corporations in the real estate field are replete with assertions
that it is unethical practice for the layman to employ an attorney and
then interject himself between the attorney and his client. Cf. State Bar
v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 90 Ariz. 76, 336 P.2d 1 (1961), modi-
fied on rehearing, 91 Ariz. 293, 371 P.2d 1020 (1962). The commenta-
tors are also unanimous in pointing out that the principal way in which
laymen and corporations are able to engage in unauthorized practice is
through the use of employed attorneys, and that such employment vio-
lates canons of ethics. See, e.g., HURST, supra note 2, at 321; JOHNSTONE
& HoPsoN, supra note 5, at 27; Cedarquist, Lawyers Aiding Unauthorized
Practice, in NAT'L CONFERENCE ON THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW 91
(mimeo. 1962); Gambrell, Lay Encroachments on the Legal Profession,
29 MICH. L. REV. 989 (1931); Hamner, Title Insurance Companies
and the Practice of Law, 14 BAYLOR L. REv. 384 (1962); Hicks &
Katz, The Practice of Law by Laymen & Lay Agencies, 41 YALE
L.J. 69 (1931); Murphy, The Activities of Title Insurance Com-
panies, in NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF
LAw 149 (mimeo. 1962); Report of the Standing Committee on Pro-
fessional Ethics & Grievances, 55 A.B.A. REP. 476 (1930); Report of
the Standing Committee on Unauthorized Practice of Law, 75 A.B.A.
REP. 242 (1950); Report of the Special [later Standing] Committee
on Unauthorized Practice of the Law, 56 A.B.A. REP. 470 (1931).
However, beyond those cases where an attorney was clearly using
a corporation merely as a "front" to solicit business there seems to be
no reported case in which any effort has been made to discipline an
attorney who has been doing the work of unauthorized practice for the
corporation. Readers should ponder the words of S. B. Houck, then
chairman of the A.B.A.'s Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of
Law, who on the floor at the annual meeting of the A.B.A. in 1935
said:
The thing which makes possible much of the illegal practice of
law is the fact that it is being done by lawyers in cooperation
or partnership, or in some other form of association with lay-
men. We feel that in many instances we are subjecting our-
selves to rather serious criticism when we direct our activity to
the layman and let the lawyer who has made possible this
illegal practice go unscathed, uncriticized, untouched.
60 A.B.A. REP. 144 (1935).
The thrust of the present article is the unauthorized practice of
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joined from handling all details of real estate transactions
through its own legal department. The same line of attack was
used in Kentucky, where a building and loan association was the
defendant." 0
The most spectacular litigations brought against title com-
panies on the grounds of unauthorized practice have been those
Texas cases, already cited, in which the primary complaint was
against abstract company agents of title insurers. Here it has
ordinarily been held that the abstract or title company is illegally
practicing law when it attempts to render "complete title ser-
vice," even though it employs legal counsel."' The same result
corporations and the ramifications of the unethical practice controversy
will not be explored. However, before leaving the subject some rather
harsh and disagreeable questions which, up to now, seem to have been
carefully swept under the rug should be posed to committees on ethics.
If a title insurance company is engaged in unauthorized practice of law,
are its employed attorneys subject to disbarment for aiding laymen in
such practice? If attorney X, who practices "independently," does all
of the title work for Y Mortgage Co. and the latter actively solicits
business and renders "complete title service," is X soliciting through a
lay intermediary and assisting the intermediary to engage in unauthor-
ized practice? The DEcLARATiO OF PluNcP'LEs BETWEEN STATE BAR OF
Texas, TEXAS LAND TITLE AsS'N AND TITLE UNDERWRITERS OF TEXAS, INc.
(adopted April 26, 1963), provides:
Lawyers who accept referrals of professional employment from
a title company in such volume and regularity and under such
circumstances whereby the interests of their clients are sub-
ordinated to the interests of the title company, do so in viola-
tion of the Canons of Ethics and also of the fundamental prin-
ciple that a lawyer must represent his client with unqualified
allegiance.
The Standing Committee on Professional Ethics of the American Bar
Association has ruled only on peculiarly complex arrangements. It has
treated these arrangements in terms of the dual representation ques-
tion but has not considered the question of solicitation. See Informal
Opinions, No. C-472 (Dec. 26, 1961), 886 (Sept. 28, 1965), and 954 (Aug.
8, 1966).
109. People v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 M. 462, 176
N.E. 901 (1931).
110. Kentucky State Bar Ass'n v. First Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n,
342 S.W.2d 397 (Ky. 1961).
111. Alamo Title Co. v. San Antonio Bar Ass'n, 360 S.W.2d 814 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1962); Amarillo Abstract & Title Co. v. Unauthorized Practice
of Law Comm., 332 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960); San Antonio Bar
Ass'n v. Guardian Abstract & Title Co., 156 Tex. 7, 291 S.W.2d 697
(1956); Rattikin Title Co. v. Grievance Comm., 272 S.W.2d 948 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1954); Hexter Title & Abstract Co. v. Grievance Comm.,
142 Tex. 506, 179 S.W.2d 946 (1944); Stewart Abstract Co. v. Judicial
Comm'n, 131 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939). But cf. Sitton v. Ameri-
can Title Co. of Dallas, 396 S.W.2d 899 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) (appeal for
writ of error refused). Ironically, in the face of this widespread success
in the courts, Hamner reports that "results of [this] litigation thus far
have had minimum industry-wide impact upon actual practices, in sub-
stance." Hamner, Title Insurance Companies and the Practice of Law,
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has been reached in Arkansas, 112 although in Florida the most
recent cases permit such service." 3 Elsewhere it has been found
that title insurance companies offering full title service are sub-
ject to injunction,1 4 the only clear exception coming from those
states in which legislative supremacy prevails." 5 The reason
for the majority view is perhaps best summed up in Pioneer
Title Insurance & Trust Company v. State Bar,"6 where it was
argued by the company that it was doing little more than the
clerical completion of standardized forms. The court responded:
The difficulty with the company's position is that its services
did not end with the clerical preparation of the instruments by
the escrow officer and stenographer. It was the company itself
which judged of the legal sufficiency of the instruments to ac-
complish the agreement of the parties. In the drafting of any
instrument, simple or complex, this exercise of judgment dis-
tinguishes the legal from the clerical service....
We may note that notwithstanding the standardization of
procedures, self-reliance upon questions involving one's legal
14 BAYLOR L. REv. 384, 386 (1962). Correspondence by the author
with practicing attorneys in Texas in 1967 indicates that abstract and
title companies in the larger cities generally ignore the rules laid down
in these cases, but that beyond these urban areas there is relatively
little unauthorized practice. For an attempt by one local bar to ob-
tain a modus vivendi with the title companies, see San Antonio Bar
Association Committee on Unauthorized Practice of Law Secures Coop-
eration of Title Companies, 17 UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE NEws 6 (No. 1,
1951).
112. Beach Abstract & Guar. Co. v. Bar Ass'n, 230 Ark. 494, 326
S.W.2d 900 (1959).
113. Florida Bar v. McPhee, 195 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 1967); Cooperman
v. West Coast Title Co., 75 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 1954). For background on
the former case, see Florida Bar Commences Action Against Out-of-
State Lawyer and Insurer, 32 UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE NEWS 88 (No. 1,
1966). Florida Bar v. Columbia Title Co., 197 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1967).
The actual practices carried out by the Florida companies have been
unusually varied. Jennings, Common Problems of the Mortgage & Title
Man, 30 TITLE NEWS 5 (No. 5, 1951). But that the companies' objective is
to take over the complete title transaction is clear. Craig, Abstracters,
Title Insurance Agents and Bar Funds, 46 TrTL NEws 99 (No. 1, 1967).
It is reported that in Florida while "some reputable brokers recommend
that parties seek the advice of their lawyers .. . many affirmatively
advise that the parties do not need a lawyer." Committee on Real
Estate Contracts, Construction Contracts and Closings, 2 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TRUST J. 325 (1967).
114. State Bar v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 90 Ariz. 76, 366
P.2d 1 (1961), modified on rehearing, 91 Ariz. 293, 371 P.2d 1020 (1962);
Pioneer Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. State Bar, 74 Nev. 186, 326 P.2d 408
(1958); People v. Lawyers Title Corp., 282 N.Y. 513, 27 N.E.2d 30 (1940).
115. Bar Ass'n v. Union Planters Title Guar. Co., 46 Tenn. App. 100,
326 S.W.2d 767 (1959). The exact position of the Georgia Supreme
Court is equivocal. Georgia Bar Ass'n v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 222
Ga. 657, 151 S.E.2d 718 (1966).
116. 74 Nev. 186, 192-93, 326 P.2d 408, 411-12 (1958).
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rights in the acquisition of a home is not yet to be regarded as
common. The average layman, in a transaction of such com-
parative importance to him, wishes the assurance of a competent
adviser that all is properly in order.
This, then, was not a case of self-reliance. It is clear from
the record that the company not only exercised its judgment in
this regard but invited the parties to rely on it. It is clear that
there was such reliance. The parties were assured that the trans-
action in all respects would be legally effective; that the com-
pany would see to that. This assurance appears not only from
testimony as to the procedure followed but also from evidence
of television advertising employed by the company.
It is no escape that the company, through its obligations as
insurer, might well be liable for lack of legality with respect to
title. This does not resolve the case into one of the company act-
ing for itself. It is one thing to pass judgment for others as to
the legality of their transaction. It is quite another to indemnify
them against loss through failure of legality. Insurance may
well be reassuring; but it is no complete substitute for legality.
The parties wish to avoid all legal trouble; even trouble with
their insurer. They wish peaceful legality and not a monetary
substitute.
As to any independent obligations the company may have
had as escrow holder, we may simply note that one may not
legitimatize his otherwise unlawful practice of the law by con-
tractually obligating himself to achieve legal effectiveness.
This is but a contract to pass legal judgment; that is, a contract
to practice law.
In the instant case judgment as to legal sufficiency was, it is
true, made by an attorney. The problem of lack of competence
is not, therefore, present. We are, however, still faced with a
complete lack of the essential attorney-client relationship in con-
nection with the legal rights of the parties. The company at-
torney's concern with the legality of the instruments was from
the point of view of the company's rights and obligations and not
from the point of view of the rights and obligations of the parties
to the transaction. The attorney was not advised that he was to
serve as attorney for the parties and was to examine the instru-
ments with an eye to the legal rights of those parties as his own
clients independent of the company. Had this been done, in the
light of the parties' apparent consent that the company attorney
act as their own attorney and in the absence of any conflict of
interest in the drafting of the instruments, the case might well
be different.
And at another point the court said:
The need for legal counseling in any transaction is a question
which must be decided by the person whose legal rights are in-
volved. If, in his judgment, he does not need advice as to his
legal rights or assistance with respect to them, no one can com-
plain of his self-reliance. Such a case must be a true case of
self-reliance, however. If reliance be placed upon the judgment
of others as to his legal rights, the case is different. If advice orjudgment is professionally given by one not a party to the trans-
action and not an attorney, a problem of unauthorized practice
is presented.
It is clear, therefore, that the reason title companies and similar
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lay institutions or individuals are forbidden to give complete title
service is that such service is relied upon by the buyer. The in-
ducement of such reliance is the essence of practicing law. A
layman cannot avoid the rule by employing salaried attorneys
nor by using so-called "independent" attorneys who are essen-
tially the creatures of their employer.117 This rule, of general
application in all unauthorized practice litigation, is of equal
force when lay excursions into the title field are involved." 8
E. Tim EFFECT OF INCONSISTENCY
At best, the foregoing review of present authority leaves one
in a state of confusion as to what the courts will or will not per-
mit title companies to do."1 9 At worst, it takes one into a never-
never land in which courts ignore the real substance of day-to-
day title transactions, the needs of the participants, and the need
for clearly enunciated goals.120  The courts have adopted half-
way measures incompatible with legal logic or functional utility.
Such legal confusion is important, since until it is resolved home
buyers will lack proper protection, and the various land transfer
institutions will be unable to act vigorously and purposefully.
Strong public policy considerations require that home buyers
receive advice and assurance not presently afforded, and that, in
117. See cases cited note 14 supra.
118. E.g., People v. People's Stock Yard State Bank, 334 Ill. 462,
176 N.E. 901 (1931); New Jersey State Bar Ass'n v. Northern N.J. Mort-
gage Associates, 32 N.J. 430, 161 A.2d 257 (1960), modified, 34 N.J. 301,
169 A.2d 150 (1961); Rattikin Title Co. v. Grievance Comm., 272 S.W.2d
948 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954); In re Droker, 59 Wash. 2d 707, 370 P.2d 242
(1962); State ex rel. State Bar v. Cunningham-Nield Realty, Inc., 25
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE NEWS 306 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1960).
119. In the summary to the annotation found at 85 A.L.R.2d 184,
dealing with title examination activities by lending institution, insur-
ance company, or title and abstract company, as illegal practice of law,
the annotator says:
In conclusion, the varieties of factors involved, statutes ap-
plied, and judicial attitudes reflected, makes substantially im-
possible the formulation of any neat legal statement as a basis
for predicting results. Although some of the cases reaching
opposite results may be truly contrary, and others reconcilable,
any comprehensive description undertaking such a catalogue
would be open to argument at best.
Id. at 188.
120. JomsToNE & HoPsoN, supra note 5, at 173, have said:
Uncertainty in the law of unauthorized practice has been in-
creased by failure of the courts to clarify adequately policy on
the subject. They have failed to sufficiently explore and ar-
ticulate the goals they are working towards in allocating func-
tions to the bar and its competitors. Nor have they fully con-
sidered the implications of the goals that they apparently do
articulate.
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return for the one to three billion dollars paid each year in clos-
ing costs, they obtain maximum protection. At the same time the
interests of institutions involved in the transfer process cannot
be ignored. Title insurance is used primarily to protect mort-
gagees; mortgage credit is an integral part of most home buy-
ing; 21 and the bulk of these mortgages are held by institutional
lenders having legitimate needs which must be fulfilled if
revolutionary changes in the economy are to be avoided. Insti-
tutional financing undergirds the entire construction industry,
which is probably the largest segment of the industrial mix.
Although completely consistent data is unavailable, in 1966 the
outstanding mortgage indebtedness on one to four bedroom fam-
ily houses was $255.1 billion 22 of a total countrywide mortgage
indebtedness of $347.1 billion. 123 In that year the total value of
new residential buildings was between $15 billion and $19 bil-
lion' 24 of a total of all new construction of between $61 billion
and $74 billion.125 Also to be considered is the personal welfare
of a host of individuals besides home buyers-lawyers, owners
and employees of financial and insuring institutions, their sup-
pliers, and the entire construction industry. The title insurance
companies themselves must be considered. Allegedly, they col-
lect premiums of some $130 million per year, have an invested
capital of $500 million, and pay employees, numbering 42,000,
annual salaries of $280 million.' 26 The very size of the enterprise
demands serious circumspection before suggesting innovations.
However, if innovation is needed it should be given high priority.
Judicial failure to establish a clear doctrinal basis for such
innovation may be the source of frustration to those who are
eager for immediate answers to all the questions which have
been shoved under the rug. But in many respects this failure is
a singular blessing. A new start is called for. Satisfactory legal
doctrine cannot be developed until there is clear understanding
121. The Director of Research of the National Association of Real
Estate Boards estimates that in recent years nine out of ten housing
sales have involved a mortgage. LAwYEs' TITLE NEWS 8 (Jan., 1968).
122. The American Bankers' Association's estimate for that year was
$225 billion. SuBCOmm. ON HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, Comm. ON
BANKING AND CURRNcy, UNITED STATES SENATE, A STUDY OF MORTGAGE
CREDIT 146 (1967).
123. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNrrED STATES 462 (1967).
124. Id. at 712, 713.
125. Id. at 711, 713. Statistics vary depending upon what items are
included in the data.
126. Burlingane, Can This Marriage Be Saved?, 47 TITLE NEWS 75
(No. 1, 1968). These figures may be inflated and at best can be based
on an educated guess.
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of the practical alternatives presently available, and the com-
peting needs of the parties. These are unexplored functional
problems, and the lack of consistent, well-reasoned legal doctrine
permits the courts to approach them realistically and without
the embarrassment otherwise created by case law geared to ar-
rangements no longer socially suitable. We are, therefore, rel-
atively free to consider the institutional context in which the law
will develop and the courses of action which this context should
encourage.
IIl. THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
A. THE PROBLEMS OF PRESENT CONVEYANCIG SYSTEMS
The exact details of land transfer vary from one locality to
another. However, it has been suggested that under the impetus
furnished by the growing national mortgage market, 27 suf-
ficiently stylized procedures are developing in the buying and
selling of homes to permit one to speak of a "typical" transaction
having certain characteristics, despite local variations in detail. 2 8
In a "typical" transaction, the buyer and seller are brought to-
gether by a real estate broker. After the contract of sale is
signed, one of two procedures is followed. The buyer may turn
over to the broker the work of obtaining financing and closing
the transaction. The broker then goes to a lending institution,
which receives title assurance from its own house counsel, an
"independent" attorney, or a title insurance company. The de-
tails of closing the loan are handled either by the broker, the
lending institution, its attorney, a title insurance company or an
escrow company. Under the other procedure the buyer ap-
proaches the lender directly. In either event, the buyer is not
represented by counsel, and the entire process is carried out by
laymen or by corporations acting through attorneys who are in
fact their alter ego. 129
127. It is now being urged that institutional lenders should demand
title insurance in the case of all mortgages, even if sale is not immedi-
ately contemplated, in order to preserve long-term liquidity. Schwartz,
Title Insurance Liquifies "Frozen" Mortgage Assets, 46 TITLE NEWS 15
(No. 9, 1967).
128. Payne, A Typical House Purchase Transaction in the United
States, 30 CONVEY. (n.s.) 194 (1966); Payne, 101 Home Buyers, 16 ALA.
L. REV. 275 (1964). Professor Raushenbush has quite properly warned
against the lack of hard data as to how American conveyancing is
actually carried out. Raushenbush, Under the Microscope, 47 TimE
Naws 14 (No. 1, 1968). Until such data is available, if we are to move
forward, we are forced to rely upon the best evidence at hand, even if
some of it may be of an impressionistic nature.
129. This system is strongly reinforced by the insistence on the
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Such an arrangement requires an entirely new phrasing of
part of institutional lenders and title insurance companies that their
attorneys do the major part of the work. In the Report of the Com-
mittee on Real Estate Contracts of the A.B.A. Section of Real Property,
Probate & Trust Law, Handling and Closing Real Estate Transactions,
1 REAL PROP., PROB. & TRuST L.J. 463 (1966), it was reported that a
questionnaire sent to life insurance companies indicated that 33 of the
companies used their own attorney to close loans; 23 used title insurance
company employees; 29 used a lender's attorney; and only 5 used the
borrower's attorney. The report did not indicate the extent to which
the procedure was demanded. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 235.088 (Supp. 1967)
prohibits any bank, savings and loan association or other lender or
lending agency from designating an attorney to represent the mort-
gagor's interest "when the mortgagor has or desires a different attorney
for that purpose." See also Wisconsin Savings and Loan Commissioner
Issues Warning to Savings and Loan Associations, 32 UNAUTHORIZED
PRACTICE NEWS 96 (Spring, 1966). It should be noted that the statute
does not literally forbid the lender from having its own attorney. While
the statute has not been construed, the author is informed by Mr. John
B. McCarthy, staff counsel for the State Bar of Wisconsin, that the
committee hearing records indicate that no such prohibition was in-
tended. As to who selects the attorney he reports a variety of prac-
tices in different parts of the state:
As a practical matter, we conclude that there is no uniform
practice in this state. In some of the larger cities, such as
Madison, Racine, Green Bay and others, the banks and savings
and loan associations will accept the title opinions of nearly
every member of the bar. (In those few instances in which
they feel they cannot rely on such opinion, they will have their
own lawyer reexamine the abstract without charge.) Natur-
ally, this is the preferred practice in our estimation.
In some communities, where the mortgage lenders insist on
opinion of their own counsel, other lawyers in representing the
purchaser will adjust their fees to credit the client for the
amount paid as part of the loan fee for title opinion to the
lender.
In a number of communities, and in the Milwaukee area, I
believe unfortunately that the purchasers frequently have to
rely on the lender's attorney, rather than incur the additional
financial burden of a separate attorney who will render a title
opinion for the purchaser exclusively.
The above information pertains to the local lending institu-
tion practices. Our experience is that the large insurance com-
panies loaning money on residential properties insist that their
local counsel examine the abstract, and the buyers usually rely
on such opinion.
Letter of July 24, 1967.
The American home buyer, unlike his English counterpart, has not
been educated to the need for two lawyers in a land transfer and, ad-
visedly or not, is under the impression that if the title is good enough
for the mortgagee it is good enough for him. The English practice of
having two solicitors is no doubt in part the result of the enforced
system of scale fees, whereby no savings results from having only one.
Where a solicitor represents both parties to a land transfer he re-
ceives the full scale fee from each. This system has come under severe
criticism, and the National Board for Prices and Incomes has recom-
mended that in such cases the solicitor receive only 50 per cent in addi-
tion to what he would be paid for representing a single party. REPORT
No. 54, REMUNERATION OF SOLICITORS, Cmnd. 3529 (1968).
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the argument on the role of title insurance companies. Up to
now commentators have attacked title insurance companies for
unauthorized practice because they have used paid attorneys who
do not represent the buyer. But the buyer gets no better treat-
ment if the loan is handled by the "independent" lawyer of a
bank, savings and loan association, or mortgage company. Thus,
it is meaningless to attack the title companies without consider-
ing the institutional lenders. It must be recognized that the title
companies play only a satellite role. Whether the legal work
incidental to his purchase is carried out by such a title company
or by the institutional lender is immaterial to the buyer.
To the cynic, a dispute between the bar and the insurance
companies may appear to be merely an economic struggle be-
tween equally qualified contenders. But, when it is recognized
that the overriding issue is whether corporate lenders should be
allowed to dominate and direct conveyancing for their own ex-
clusive benefit, a different face is placed on the matter, and the
interest of the general public becomes obvious. The ultimate
objective of the rules regarding unauthorized practice is to obtain
maximum protection for laymen unacquainted with legal tech-
nicality. The existing system fails completely in this respect and
should be assessed de novo.
Although the system may seem to have grown like Topsy,
to say that it is the product of chance would be fallacious. A
number of easily recognized forces have been decisive. To begin
with, the conventional system of establishing title to land is in-
defensibly inefficient and has been steadily breaking down under
its own weight. It has been a source of chronic frustration on
the part of all laymen who have had to deal with it.
During approximately the last half-century the source of
mortgage funds has drastically shifted from individual lenders
to financial institutions. Concurrently, the prevalence of home
mortgaging has greatly increased. As institutional lending has
mushroomed, the paper work imposed on the lenders has also
burgeoned, and the invention of mortgage insurance and the
development of a national market have created a demand for a
highly stylized transaction. Under these conditions lenders have
manipulated procedures to fit their own needs insofar as is com-
patible with the law. In particular, they have demanded that the
details of the mortgage transaction be handled by their own
agents or by others sufficiently dependent on the lender to be
willing to meet its requirements. The system that has resulted
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is one which suits lenders but which has minimal advantage to
the home buyer.
B. ALTENATI CoNvEYANcING SySTMS
It can be argued that governmental intervention is not
needed, that both the courts and the legislatures should adopt a
policy of "wise and masterly inactivity," and that organic growth
should be permitted to proceed unimpeded. But, such a course
serves the needs of society very poorly. Careful consideration
should be given to the issue of what affirmative action can be
taken to make the process of acquiring title more compatible
with fairness to the purchaser.
1. Sanctioning Corporate Conveyancers
One possibility is that the courts accept de jure what is now
a de facto situation, and permit corporations to act as convey-
ancers. To do so would violate traditional canons against corpo-
rate practice of law but might be justified as a permissible excep-
tion on grounds of public policy. This form of conveyancing has
the support of the broker-mortgagee-title insurance company en-
tente and actually prevails in some parts of the country. Where
it has been used, no strong vocalized objections nor complaints of
inconvenience from the public have 'been heard. Nevertheless, it
is doubtful that most courts would sanction such an alternative if
made fully aware of all the facts. It is too much at war with the
whole spirit of the rules against unauthorized practice, creates
insoluble conflicts of interest for the attorney involved,130 gives
the home buyer an unwarranted sense of security, and encour-
ages the increase of costs. Furthermore, a corporate monopoly
of conveyancing might have even more serious indirect and gen-
eralized results than those occurring directly in single trans-
actions.
130. Tucker, Whom Does the Settlement Attorney Represent?, 47
TITLE NEWS 8 (No. 3, 1968); Lawyers and Title Insurance, 51 JUDICATURE
112 (1967). At least theoretically these difficulties can be avoided.
Lieberman, supra note 96, at § 1.12. In the cases in which the furnishing
of complete title service has been enjoined, the conflict of interest im-
posed upon the attorney involved has been generally alluded to. See
also T. SmEDLEY, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY PROBLEMS RELATING TO
MORTGAGE TRANSACTIONS (1966). Curiously enough, one of the most
forceful indictments of the "one lawyer" method of handling title
transactions has come from the American Land Title Association. STATE-
IENT IN OPPOSITION TO ACTION BY THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS TO SPONSOR
A NATIONAL TITLE INSURANdE CoMPANY 8-9 (1967).
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It is recognized among disinterested observers that radical
and far-reaching reform of the entire conveyancing system is
needed if we are to have fair, efficient, and moderately-priced
land transfers. But if the lending institutions and the title in-
surance companies should succeed in obtaining a monopoly, the
reform movement would be stultified. Lacking incentive for re-
form, the companies would be indifferent or hostile to it and
laymen would possess none of the knowledge and expertise
needed to recommend viable alternatives. The bar, having been
deprived of this kind of practice, would lose both the interest
and technical skill necessary to frame and effectuate the required
measures.
Finally, the system of corporate conveyancing would further
fortify the most unsatisfactory aspect of the land transfer sys-
tem: out-dated public land records. Almost universally these
records are maintained in such an antiquated form that they are,
for practical purposes, unusable. As a consequence, the public
has been forced to rely upon private sets of records kept by ab-
stracters and local title insurance companies. The public, of
course, pays the price for this unwarranted duplication-a price
which in many instances is determined in a monopolistic setting.
Because this indirect tax upon the land-buying public for the
benefit of private individuals is intolerable, the heart of the
modern reform movement is a complete renovation of the re-
cording system. To legalize corporate conveyancing would be to
destroy a major incentive for such reform.
If the courts should conclude that corporate conveyancing is
compatible with the public interest, a number of innovations
would be required. Lawyers cannot solicit and cannot compete
with lay organizations which are free to do so. 131 Once convey-
131. This has been universally admitted by the bar. See, e.g., Ad-
ler, Lawyers and Title Insurance Companies, 22 UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE
NEws 13 (No. 3, 1956); Cedarquist, Lawyers Aiding Unauthorized Prac-
tice of Law, 28 UAUTHORmmED PRACTICE NEWS 348 (1962-3); Clark, The
Effect of Unauthorized Practice of Law upon the Ethics of the Legal
Profession, 5 LAw & CONTEMPA. PROB. 97 (1938); Report of the A.B.A.'s
Standing Committee on Unauthorized Practice of the Law, 84 A.B.A.
REP. 336, 590 (1959); 85 A.B.A. REP. 199 (1960); 88 A.B.A. REP. 243,
(1963). The title companies particularly have been waging a vigorous
advertising and promotional program. See, e.g., Report of the Public
Relations Committee, 45 TITLE NEWS 39 (No. 1, 1966); Report of the
Chairman, Public Relations Committee, 44 TITLE NEWS 72 (No. 1, 1965);
Report of the Secretary and Director of Public Relations, 44 TITLE
NEWS, 88 (No. 1, 1965); 44 TiE NEWS, 74 (No. 1, 1965) (report re-
garding the appointment of Deane and Heller as the Association's
public relations advisors); New Pamphlets Stimulate Public Educa-
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ancing is recognized as a function of corporations, sufficient busi-
ness to encourage individual lawyers to maintain the required
expertise will no longer exist. When the bar can no longer carry
out this kind of work, corporations privileged to act as convey-
ancers should be compelled to do so. In no other way could the
public be assured of proper supervision of all title transactions.
In return for this monopoly the corporations should accept public
utility status13 2-a status requiring that they adopt uniform ac-
counting systems133 and submit to regulation as to policy cover-
tion Program, 46 TI=E NEWS 14 (No. 6, 1967). Although individual
lawyers may not solicit, the collective bar may engage in some forms of
advertising. The lack of any bar program comparable to that of the
title companies had been pointed out by Balbach, Title Insurance and
the Lawyer, 52 A.B.A.J. 65 (1966).
132. Title insurance companies, like other insurance companies, are
already subject to potential regulation. They are also subject to the
antitrust laws and are not within the limitations of the McCarran Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1012, 1013 (1967). Currently they are undoubtedly vio-
lating antitrust laws by the unilateral fixings of rates and coverage.
United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944);
United States v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 242 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Ill.
1965); Calvin & Dirlam, Anti-Trust Regulation and the Insurance In-
dustry: A Study in Polarity, 11 ANTITRUST BULL. 235 (1966). See gen-
erally Wiley, Pups, Plants and Package Policies, 6 Viu. L. REv. 281
(1961); Note, Applications of Federal Antitrust Laws to the Insurance
Industry, 46 Anlu. L. REV. 1088 (1962) ; Note, The Title Insurance Industry
and Governmental Regulation, 53 VA. L. REV. 1523 (1967). Even strong
supporters of title insurance are beginning to advocate government con-
trol. Roberts, Title Insurance: State Regulation and the Public Per-
spective, 39 IND. L.J. 1 (1963). The American Land Title Association
has promulgated its own MODEL TITLE INSURANCE CODE (1965), an
effort to obtain favorable state regulation rather than more stringent
federal control.
133. The title insurers have never adopted uniform accounting sys-
tems, a fact that has caused dissatisfaction in at least the powerful New
York Insurance Department. Beal, There's No Accounting for Systems,
47 TITLE NEWS 34 (No. 1, 1968). See also Gray, Title Insurance Com-
panies in 4 EXAm.NATION OF INSURANCE COMPANIES 227, 237-47 (1954).
GEORGE W. ALGER, REPORT To His ExCELLENcY HERBERT H. LEHmAN,
GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 52-54 (1934). Although no
study has been made of the system of reporting used by the companies,
it is known that in some states they file no reports at all and in others
reports of the most sketchy form. The insurers themselves are pres-
ently engaged in an effort to standardize their various accounting sys-
tems. Julin, A Better Best Seller, 47 TIME NEWS 25 (No. 1, 1968).
However, there is no evidence that any truly satisfactory system, prop-
erly allocating expenses to various categories of underwriting, loss, over-
head, and the like is evolving. The lack of proper accounting is particu-
larly marked in the case of companies carrying on mixed national and
local operations. The major cost for a local company is that of main-
taining its title plant, but no such cost is entailed in operating on a
national basis. Where such dual operations are being carried out the
company should be compelled to keep separate accounts relating to the
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age'3 4 and rates.135 Obviously, under these circumstances lend-
ing institutions should be excluded from conveyancing, and
the monopoly should be vested in regulated title companies.
Lending institutions are not interested in land transfers in which
they are not the mortgagees and have no desire to serve the
general public in other types of transactions. Since conveyanc-
ing activities are peripheral to lending institutions, they could
hardly be subjected to proper controls. Furthermore, if cor-
porate conveyancers were compelled to serve all persons, it
should be made economically possible for them to do so. Thus,
two forms of insurance, with an equitable allocation of general overhead
expenses between the two.
134. In the case of most insurance, regulation of the policy form is
designed primarily to prevent unwise underwriting practices which
might threaten the solvency of the company. In the case of title insur-
ance the main thrust will have to be directed toward obtaining adequate
coverage. Note, The Title Insurance Industry and Governmental Regu-
lation, supra note 133. It is now being contended that even to meet the
demands of the national mortgage market the present LIC and ALTA
standard mortgagee policies will have to be liberalized to provide
blanket protection, without exception. Bacon, Revamping the Mortgage
Market-The Title Company's Role, 47 TI=E NEWS 41 (No. 1, 1968).
135. Such regulation is already permitted in a few states. E.g.,
LA. REv. STAT. § 22:1406 (1959); N.Y. INS. LAw §§ 186, 440 (McKinney
1966); TEx. INs. CODE, art. 9.03 (1952).
Assuming adequate accounting is provided, three major problems
will be faced in rate fixing. The experience of the Florida Lawyers
Guaranty Fund indicates the present uniform national rate of $2.50 per
thousand for mortgagee's and $3.50 per thousand for owner's coverage is
too high. The Fund charges only about $1.80 for combined coverage,
SCHEDULE Or ADDITIONAL CONTRBUTIONS (1961); has a loss ratio of just
over one per cent of premiums, Lawyers Invade Title Insurance Business,
BusINss WEEK, Oct. 21, 1961, at 47; and earns profits of 50 per cent or
more. Rush, Title Assurance-A Bar Responsibility, 38 Fla. B.J. 78
(1964); Yelen, Lawyers' Title Guaranty Fund: The Florida Experience,
51 A.B.A.J. 1070 (1965).
The second question is whether the additional 40 per cent premium
for the owner's coverage is justified? The traditional wisdom is that it
is, because of the longer duration of coverage. 5 TITLE INSURNCE CoM-
PAwzms (1963). This argument is disproved by the Florida experience,
and by the fact that virtually all losses occur within the first few years
of coverage, Deafly, One Man Looks at Public Regulation, 42 TITLE
NEws 5 (No. 3, 1963), and that all losses combined, somewhere in the
two per cent range, Fiflis, supra note 102, at 442; Roberts, supra note 133,
at 11, are so small as to be inconsequential.
The third question is whether all title insurance rates are too high?
Sparse available information indicates that commercial title insurance
company profits range from a little over four per cent to better than 35
per cent of gross income. 5 TITLE INSURACE COMPANIES 18-19 (1963);
Willatt, Title Insurance, BA1R.ONS, Sept. 18, 1961, at 5; Lawyers Invade
Title Insurance Business, supra. These returns are incompatible with
public utility status and, until the companies produce adequate statisti-
cal data, regulatory bodies will be justified in setting rates de novo.
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in small communities where the volume of land transfers is in-
sufficient to support more than one institutional conveyancer, it
would be unrealistic to permit an unregulated lender to drain off
the most profitable work, leaving only the dregs to the regulated
title company.
Another problem arises in the case of sparsely populated
counties, where the volume of all property transfers is insuf-
ficient to support even a title company vested with a monopoly.
Assuming that title companies will continue to establish multiple
branches, as seems to be the trend ;oday, such companies, in re-
turn for being permitted to establish more than one office, should
be compelled to locate branches in every county seat within
their respective areas of operations. The loss incurred in the
smallest communities would be balanced out by profits made in
large cities. The same principle applies in the case of other public
utilities, such as railroads, which must support some unprofitable
stations as return for their franchise privileges.
A principal reason for forcing public utility status on the
title companies would be to insure adequate protection for the
land buyer. The companies would be subjected to the same
liability as attorneys; that is, they would be compelled to give
advice as to the full range of the buyer's rights and obligations
and would be liable in tort for any act of negligence in connection
with the transfer transaction. Title insurance companies may
already be under such an obligation when they assume control
over transfers, 36 but this liability should be clearly enunciated
and accepted. Adoption of such a theory, where the title com-
136. A basis for such liability has already been established. Valdez
v. Taylor Auto. Co., 129 Cal. App. 2d 810, 278 P.2d 91 (1955); Ken-
tucky State Bar Ass'n v. First Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n, 342 S.W.2d
397 (Ky. 1961); Vogler v. Grossfield, 25 UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE NEWS
194 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1959); Renkert v. Title Guar. Trust Co., 102 Mo.
App. 267, 76 S.W. 641 (1903); O'Shea v. First Fed. Savings & Loan
Ass'n, 405 S.W.2d 180 (Tenn. 1966); Liebarman, supra note 96, at §§ 17.8-
17.10; McMahon, Title Searches: Tort Liability in California, 7 SANTA
CLARA LAW. 257 (1967); Payne, 101 Home Buyers, 16 ALA. L. REV. 273,
336 n.51 (1955). The theory of liability underlying these authorities is
the classic tort concept that when one undertakes to act he must exercise
due care. The same theory was applied even more sweepingly in an
analogous California case where it was held that a building and loan
association which ostensibly furnished financing only but which actually
exercised supervision over construction could be held to liability for
structural defects in a house. Burgess v. Conejo Valley Dev. Co., 61
Cal. Rptr. 333 (1967). The possibility of liability is beginning to be
appreciated by real estate brokers. Bernstein, The Arizona Realtors and
the 1962 Arizona Constitutional Amendment, 29 UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE
NEws 169 (Summer, 1963); Garber, Don't Make A False Assumption,
46 TITLE NEWS 2 (No. 5, 1967).
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pany is acting for the buyer, seller and mortgagee, may create
serious conflicts of interest. Unless the courts find that these
conflicts present an insuperable obstacle to corporate conveyanc-
ing, the rule should be established that the primary loyalty ex-
tends to the buyer-morgagor, the party most needing protection.
To assist in policing title companies, it would be advantageous to
adopt uniform closing rules, limiting fees and other charges and
specifying the procedures to be followed. 137 In addition, it should
be mandatory that a mortgagor always receive the same assur-
ances given the mortgagee, whether it be in the form of an attor-
ney's opinion or a title insurance policy.1 8
2. Prohibition of Unauthorized Practice
An alternative to a formally recognized system of corporate
conveyancing would be strict enforcement of the common law
prohibition against unauthorized practice. Title insurance com-
panies would be barred from everything except pure insurance,
and lending institutions would be forbidden to go beyond accept-
ing or rejecting instruments offered by the borrower's attorney
and title insurance policies issued by national companies. Such a
system is undoubtedly ideal from a theoretical standpoint, but it
presents practical difficulties which should not be minimized.
In those areas where local title insurance companies currently
monopolize the examination of titles, the bar no longer has the
expertise required for the work. A breakdown of the land trans-
fer system in such areas could be avoided only by a massive
program of re-education of the bar as a prelude to regaining con-
trol of conveyancing.139 Furthermore, competency in real estate
137. Such rules are already occasionally used by bar associations.
Committee on Real Estate Contracts, Constructions Contracts and Clos-
ings, 2 REAL PROP. PROB. & TRUST J. 325 (1967).
138. The standard title insurance policy issued in California already
gives such protection.
139. The American Bar Association's Section of Real Property,
Probate and Trust Law is notoriously oriented toward title insurance
company interests. Its joint committee with representatives of the
American Land Title Association has reported that in large metropolitan
areas, where title insurance has been made available by the proprietary
companies for many years, it would "be impractical, if not impossible,
to change the practice at this time." R.P.P.T.L. Newsletter, 3 REAL
PROP., PROB. & TRUST LAw J. 62A, 62D (1968). Stanley Balback, who
heads the American Bar Association's Special Committee on Lawyers'
Title Guaranty Funds and whose bias is equally strong in the opposite
direction, does not admit that such a change would be impractical or
impossible, but concedes that a program of continuing legal education
would be needed. Title Insurance and the Lawyer, 52 A.B.A.J. 65 (1966).
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matters is by no means insured by mere admission to the bar.
Mortgage lenders are entitled to insist that the borrower em-
ploy an attorney who is capable of carrying out the work in a
manner acceptable to the lender. A prerequisite to prohibiting
mortgagees from using their own attorneys would be the estab-
lishment of an "approved attorney" system, such as that now
used by national title insurance companies. Perhaps formal cer-
tification of competency similar to that under discussion by the
American Bar Association for some years could be utilized.
Even if a qualified bar can be assured, the question remains
whether the courts will be willing to make conveyancing, in fact
as well as in theory, the monopoly of the bar by a simple return
to the prior status quo. Corporate conveyancing came into exist-
ence largely because of legitimate dissatisfaction with the inef-
ficiency of traditional land transfers. The bar has, up to now,
taken no effective steps to remedy this inefficiency. The general
nature of the reforms needed has been summarized as the crea-
tion of a usable system of land records, 140 the shortening of the
period of search,14' and the rapid purging of inconsequential
formal errors from the records. These measures, if systematic-
ally adopted, would permit lawyers to handle land transactions
with a speed and certainty that would meet the needs of the
modern mortgage lender. They are practical and reasonable and
the courts might well make their adoption a prerequisite to the
suppression of unauthorized practice by corporations.
42
140. It is admitted that a primary reason for the early spread of title
insurance in large cities was that the system of public records had be-
come so archaic as to make direct search by attorneys unprofitable.
Roberts, Title Insurance, supra note 133.
141. The most "radical" measures taken so far in this country have
been the marketable title acts. These acts cut off most interests in land
which have not been re-recorded within a stated period of years. This
period has been set at 40 years by the Model Marketable Title Act.
L. SnIEs & S. TAYLOR, THE IMPROVEMENT OF CONVEYANCING BY LEGis-
LATiON 6 (1960). Neither this nor any existing legislation is actually
effective in reducing the period of search to the period named. Payne,
In search of Title (Part. II), 14 ALA. L. REV. 278 (1962). It may sur-
prise American conveyancers to learn that in England, even where title
is not registered, a chain of title extending back only 30 years has been
declared marketable by statute and that the Law Commission is cur-
rently recommending that this period be reduced to 15 years. TRANSFER
OF LAND. INTEm REPORT ON ROOT or TiTLE TO FREEHOLD LAND (1967).
Hard-shelled American conveyancers will answer this by arguing the
existence of "different conditions" in this country. The proper retort is
that of course conditions are different in England: They have been
made so because the English people long ago had the good sense to make
wholesale changes in their land law to meet the needs of modern so-
ciety.
142. In Wayne County Bar Ass'n v. Klein (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1934) in G.
[Vol. 53:423
TITLE INSURANCE
3. Limited Title Insurance
A third solution of the unauthorized practice controversy is
to permit local title insurance companies to issue policies based
on their own examination but to allow them to perform no other
functions in connection with land transfers. An accompanying
provision might prevent the issuance of such policies except to
attorneys engaged in independent practice. Such a limitation, if
coupled with a rigid enforcement of the unauthorized practice
ban against lenders, would at first glance appear to be a satis-
factory compromise. The objection-not simply a selfish one-is
that it excludes the attorney from the most profitable aspect of
title work. Traditionally the price paid for title examination has
probably been too high. At the same time fees for the ancillary
services rendered by attorneys have been too low. But the two
balanced out, and the public obtained adequate service at a reas-
onable price. This arrangement will be upset if the lawyer loses
his fees for title examination but continues to perform ancillary
services, and he would be forced either to charge larger fees or to
abandon this segment of practice. In one case the public would
suffer financially while in the other it would be deprived of
needed services. There is evidence that in some large cities law-
yers are able to make a profit by handling title closings, based on
insurance policies issued by local companies. 143 But to do so re-
quires a sufficiently large volume of work to permit "assembly
line" procedures. Such a volume of transactions can seldom be
channeled into a single law office unless the attorneys involved
represent one or more large lending institutions; but if this is
allowed, the "solution" of the title insurance issue only intensi-
fies the problem of unauthorized practice by lenders.
IV. BELLING THE CAT
Thus, several clearcut alternatives 4 4 to the present unsatis-
BRAND, UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE DECISIONS 253, 256 (1937), the court
said: "Members of the bar must not be unmindful of the fact that
when the law says that laymen cannot practice law, that we must see
that the practice is properly conducted."
The bar has generally considered the New Jersey Mortgage Asso-
ciates cases a notable victory. The more thoughtful, however, will con-
sider the conclusion of the Housing and Home Finance Agency that, in-
sofar as the public was concerned, these decisions merely meant added
cost and that a similar decision in the Quinlan and Tyson case will in-
crease costs in Chicago. LOAN CLosno COSTS, supra note 58, at 24-25,
36-38.
143. See note 34 supra. See also Hennessey, Let's Quit Losing
Money on Real Estate Closings, 6 LAW OFF. Ec. & MAN. 175 (1965).
144. In a compromise-oriented society it is refreshing to read the
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factory system of conveyancing are available, each with certain
advantages and disadvantages. However, these alternatives can-
not be discussed without considering judicial and legislative pro-
grams necessary for their implementation. The adoption of any
such program depends upon public officials, motivated not so
much by legal theory and their sense of justice as by the pres-
sures which interested parties exert on them. It is therefore
necessary to consider each of the interested parties to the title
transaction-his needs, his wants, what he gets, the extent of his
acceptance of the status quo, and the potential assistance he may
offer in support of any effort to obtain change. The interested
parties are land buyers, sellers, brokers, mortgagees, title insur-
ance companies, and the bar.
A. LAND BUYERS
It is easy to generalize with regard to the home buyer, but
since individual buyers have different characteristics and act in
dissimilar circumstances it is not so easy to justify the conclusion
one reaches. It can be said with a degree of confidence that the
home buyer is engaged in a highly technical transaction about
which he is inexperienced; that he dislikes lawyers; and that he
is therefore receptive to the sugge.stion that laymen carry out
the entire transaction for him, particularly if some of the services
are "free." He wants complete secuxity with a minimum of ex-
pense and bother. He needs, and in theory has a right to de-
mand, a transaction meeting modern criteria of efficiency. As a
minimum he should have formal protection and the advice and
assistance of disinterested and technically qualified counsel. It
is generally agreed that the most insistent problem facing Amer-
ican conveyancers today is how such aid can be afforded.145
comment of the late Albert Schweitzer:
Progress always consists in taking one or other of two alterna-
tives, in abandoning the attempt to combine them. The pion-
eers of progress have therefore always to reckon with the law of
mental inertia which manifests itself in the majority-who al-
ways go on believing that it is possible to combine that which
can no longer be combined, and in fact claim it as a special
merit that they, in contrast with the "onesided" writers, can dojustice to the other side of the question.
A. SCHWErrZER, THE QUEST or THE HIsTOricAL JESUS 238 (1950).
145. E.g., State Bar v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 90 Ariz. 76,
366 P.2d 1 (1961); Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Quinlan & Tyson, Inc., 53 Ill. App.
2d 388, 203 N.E.2d 131 (1964), modified on other grounds, 34 Ill. 2d 116,
214 N.E.2d 771 (1966); Report of the Special Committee on Lawyers'
Title Guaranty Funds, 87 A.B.A. REP. 229 (-1962). See also Bar Eco-
nomics and Real Property Practice, A.B.A. LEGAL EcoNoMIcS NEws 3(April 1963); Report of the Committee on Title Aspects of Real Estate
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Local custom will largely determine the nature and quality
of the service the buyer will receive. At worst, after paying the
entire cost, he will receive no advice 146 or advice which is either
false or directed toward protecting the interests of the other
parties. He may receive no certificate of title, title insurance
policy, or other formal protection.147 If he suffers loss he may
Transactions, PRoc. ABA SEC. OF REAL PROP., PROB. & TRUST LAW 187
(Pt. II, 1964). For a detailed discussion of the need for representation
of the parties by attorneys even in states where title insurance and es-
crow companies handle most of the conveyancing, see Lieberman, supra
note 96, chs. 1-3.
Even the title insurance companies are becoming concerned over
the lack of protection afforded mortgagors of homes. Scott, Homeown-
ers, Too, Need Title Insurance, A maCA BANE R (April 30, 1967).
The solution suggested by Scott is that an attempt be made to sell more
owner coverage.
By coincidence, at the time of increasing concern over the elimina-
tion of the lawyer from the title transaction in the United States, in
England there is a vocal public demand to reduce the role of the so-
licitor, or, at a minimum, to scale down conveyancing costs. B. ABEL-
SMrrH & R. STEVENS, LAWYERS AND TE COURTS 385-86, 389-93 (1967);
THm LAW ComvuvssioN, TRANSFER OF LAND, INTERIM REPORT ON ROOT OF
TITLE To FREEHOLD LAND (1967); Carter, Fight for Title, The Guardian
(London) Feb. 28, 1967, at 8. The heated debate which has raged
both in the press and in professional organizations has led to the ap-
pointment of two official investigating bodies. The National Board for
Prices and Income has already submitted its report, recommending cer-
tain changes in the remuneration of solicitors. See note 129 supra., As
this is written, no report has as yet been submitted by the Monopolies
Commission, which has under study the question whether lay convey-
ancing should be permitted.
146. Our information as to the exact extent to which home buyers
are represented by attorneys is extremely limited and estimates range
considerably. In a study made of practices in one small southern city,
it was found that personal representation was highly exceptional.
Payne, supra note 128. Unterberger concludes that "the home buyer
rarely finds it necessary to employ legal services." Comment, The
Economic Dilemma of the American Lawyer, 1 LAw OFF. Ec. & MA.
40 (No. 2, 1960). In the article in The Wall Street Journal, Aug. 6,
1965, at 14, col. 1, it was said that Levitt & Sons reported that at their
Bowie, Md., development fewer than five per cent of all buyers had their
own lawyers. On the other hand, in New Jersey State Bar Ass'n v.
Northern N.J. Mortgage Associates, 32 N.J. 430, 161 A.2d 257 (1960),
the court pointed out that approximately 50 per cent of purchasers had no
independent counsel and in 10 per cent the sellers were not represented.
Note that failure to obtain prior representation for the parties is not a
phenomenon confined to home purchasing transactions, but may also
accompany the purchase of farms. C. HARRIS & N. HINES, INSTALLMENT
LAND CONTRACTS Ix IowA 16 (1965).
147. There is great misunderstanding among home buyers, many of
whom assume that title insurance issued in the name of the mortgagee
also gives the mortgagor protection. Payne, supra note 128. In New Jer-
sey and Maryland efforts to avoid this sort of misunderstanding have
resulted in statutes requiring that the title company issuing a mortgage
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have no redress. In the interim he -will believe that he is getting
full protection and adequate advice from those with whom he is
dealing, who will be clothed with all the outward indicia of
respectability and will usually be licensed by the state.148 Thus,
his reliance is certainly understandable, even though it may be
unjustified.
Only the most tentative answer can be given to the question
whether the existing system has produced results sufficiently
serious to cause concern. There is evidence that the title trans-
action is becoming more complex and more expensive, but
whether nonrepresentation of home buyers is a factor in produc-
ing these results cannot be determined. Reports appear to indi-
cate some gross inequities, but the individual home buyer is
ignorant of what to expect and has no forum in which to air
complaints of injustices. Thus, the extent to which he is being
bilked cannot be determined with any degree of accuracy.
Admittedly, there is no widespread public dissatisfaction
with the existing system. Nor does past experience indicate that
articles in mass media "exposing" the system result in great pub-
lic demand for reform. The difficulty is that the average home-
owner goes through the buying process only once or twice in a
lifetime, and, positing the threat of other immediate and pressing
problems, he will not bestir himself about an injury long-since
past or merely threatened in the remote future. Therefore, it
can be assumed that any effective reform movement will origin-
ate, not in the general public and among home buyers, but from
policy must notify the mortgagor of his right to obtain his own insur-
ance. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46: 10A-3 (1937); Report of the Committee on
Title Acceptability and Standards, PROc. A.B.A. SEc. OF REAL PROP., PROB.
& TRUST LAW 35 (Part. 11, 1962); see M. LAws ch. 714 (1967). A
less demanding requirement is that the policy itself shall contain a
conspicuous notice on its face that only the mortgagee is covered. E.g.,
WYo. STAT. § 26.1-462 (1957). Admittedly in certain areas buyer-
mortgagors have been educated to the need for combined coverage.
JOHNSTONE & HOPSON, supra note 5, at 288, report that the Chicago Title
& Trust Company contends that 90 per cent of their orders are for
mortgagee-owner policies. In California the standard policy employed
gives coverage to both the owner and mortgagee.
148. If there is a significant service to render .... why are
lawyers not more uniformly consulted in routine real property
transactions? The answer lies partly in the illusion of security
imparted by the presence of brokers and escrow officers in the
transaction, partly in the reluctance of buyers and sellers to
incur the expense of legal fees, and partly in the public ig-
norance of the need for legal services. Though this condition is
far from new, the bar has done little to educate the public con-
cerning the nature, costs and value of the services available
from attorneys.
J. LIEBERmAN, CALwoRNIA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 1.32 (1967).
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specialized groups with peculiar interest and the capacity to
make their views known.
It is pertinent that the purchaser of a home is not the only
land buyer. Very powerful groups such as oil, mining and timber
companies, as well as governmental units, are constantly en-
gaged in acquiring real estate. All have an interest in reducing
the cost, delay and uncertainty attendant upon their acquisitions.
Unaware of the potential for reform, such groups have as yet
taken no part in the debate as to what should be done, but the
possibility of enlisting their support should be fully explored by
proponents of change. Whether, if mobilized, they would sup-
port corporate conveyancing or lawyer-dominated conveyancing
is again uncertain. They are not so much interested in protect-
ing home buyers as in improving conveyancing generally. In en-
listing their support, however, lawyers have one great advantage
over their corporate competitors: The whole case for a lawyer
monopoly of conveyancing must be built on radical reform of
the land law and the methods by which titles are proved. Juxta-
posed to this is the fact that the title companies have a vested
interest in the deficiencies of the existing system. The lawyer
reformer and those lay groups seeking more efficient conveyanc-
ing procedures are therefore natural allies who may become a
dominant influence, if they can join forces.
B. SELLERS
Another interested party, the seller, traditionally wanted or
needed little from the title transaction that he did not already
receive. He was interested primarily in maximizing the purchase
price; matters such as nonrepresentation, insufficient protec-
tion of the parties, and the inefficiency of the transfer process
were not of great concern to him. In any event, he has been
another individual with no forum in which to voice his com-
plaints. However, in recent years the character of sellers has
shown a marked change and with these changes have come new
wants and needs. A large number of sellers today are mass
home builders who rely on credit and are eager to dispose of their
product as expeditiously as possible. They deal with potential
buyers who have small down payments and are frequently in a
hurry to obtain occupancy. For these potential purchasers the
cost and promptness of closings are sometimes determinative of
whether a sale takes place. In attempting to meet the buyer's
demands the builder is not concerned with whether they obtain
proper representation and protection, but he is chronically frus-
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trated by the delays and expenses of the whole transfer process.
In an effort to stimulate sales he will often assume the burden of
arranging financing and carrying the transaction to comple-
tion.149 He would undoubtedly support affirmative action with
enthusiasm if he knew that reform was possible and practical.
He is currently using corporate allies and is dependent upon
corporations for financial assistance, but it is not clear which of
the suggested alternatives would be most acceptable to him. It
would appear that the builders' interests would best be served
by the kind of reform favored by the enlightened lawyer.
C. BROKERS
The position of the real estate broker is equivocal. In theory
he is the agent of the seller, and on the basis of his own declara-
tions, a "professional," governed by a code of ethics.150 In actu-
ality, he is most frequently a hard-sell artist with no interest
except that of earning a commission through a completed sale.'5 '
He does not merely lack an attorney but bitterly resents the
appearance of one at any point in the transaction. He knows
that "lawyers queer deals," are a menace to selling agents, and
should be kept at as great a distance as possible. 52 At the same
149. The Wall Street Journal, Aug. 6, 1965, at 14, col. 1.
150. The National Association of Real Estate Boards has a Code of
Ethics which has been revised from time to time. Compare Code of
Ethics adopted in 1924, in NELSON, THE ADMINISTRATION OF REAL EsTATE
BoARDs 203 (1925) with N.A.R.B. INrERPRETATiONS OF THE CODE Or
ETmcs (2d ed. 1964) (currently in effect). These codes of ethics may
be looked upon with some degree of suspicion. Their primary purpose
appears to be that of the usual trade association code to prevent what
the proponents feel is "unfair competition." The provisions which can
be termed truly ethical are generally hortatory in nature and sufficiently
vague to include or exclude almost any actual practice. Finally, and
most importantly, there seems to be little or no evidence that they are
actually enforced and, in any event, they are not legally binding upon
real estate brokers. For recognition of the much more stringent regula-
tions applied to attorneys, see State ex rel. Bodner v. Florida Real Estate
Comm'n, 99 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 1956).
151. That the real estate agent's interests may be hostile to even
those of his client, the seller, has not escaped the courts. Hulse v.
Criger, 363 Mo. 26, 247 S.W.2d 855 (1952).
152. This lies at the heart of the controversy as to whether brokers
should be allowed to fill in form real estate sales contracts. The
argument of the real estate agents, that they should be permitted to
strike while the iron is hot and cannot wait until the buyer has ob-
tained an attorney, is specious. The purchase of a home is a sufficiently
important financial transaction that haste is not only to be avoided but
should be actively prevented. However, most real estate brokers hold
the conviction that as soon as a lawyer appears on the scene objections
may be made which will interefer with closing the deal. LiEBEmVmAN,
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time he knows that at some point an attorney will become in-
volved, for mortgage financing is a nearly universal accompan-
iment of modern home purchases, and the mortgagee must be
assured that the title of the mortgagor is sufficient to afford
adequate security. To provide this assurance a lawyer will ord-
inarily be called upon to render an opinion. If the attorney
represents the buyer, his entire loyalty will be to his client, and
the broker can expect that he will make every objection which
benefits his client's interests. If, however, the attorney repre-
sents either the mortgagee or a title insurance company with
whom the broker has regular, friendly and profitable relations,
the danger of embarrassment and delay is minimized. The mort-
gagee needs a title sufficient only to protect its investment, and a
title company can take business risks which would be unac-
ceptable to a one-time buyer. Thus, it is in the interest of the
broker to steer the buyer into the hands of the lender's attorney
or a title insurance company since neither would be expected to
act in an "unfriendly" fashion.
While brokers probably have a bias in favor of corporate
conveyancing, it is entirely possible that this bias could be elim-
inated by reforms in the conveyancing system. If lawyers would
present the brokers with a program designed to reduce the pres-
ent delays and frustrations, the breach between the two groups
could be healed. Broker opposition to lawyer-dominated con-
veyancing may thereby be eliminated, and the powerful real es-
tate lobby may even be enlisted on the side of the bar.
D. THE MORTGAGEE
The mortgagee, concerned with the business of making loans
on favorable terms, is indifferent to the buyer's legal problems
except insofar as the buyer's title is sufficient to secure the loan
and the mortgage security is properly executed and recorded.153
supra note 148, at § 14.12. For that reason brokers will not agree to
even the modest proposal of the American Bar Association's Standing
Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law, that the buyer sign
simply a "binder," subject to ratification by his attorney. Payne, supra
note 128, at 200 n.16. Compare Nelson, Drafting of Real Estate Instru-
ments: The Problem from the Standpoint of the Realtors, 5 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 57 (1938), with Houck, Drafting of Real Estate Instru-
ments: The Problem From the Standpoint of the Bar, 5 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 66 (1938). The impasse continues. Report of the Stand-
ing Committee on Unauthorized Practice of Law, 91 A.B.A. REP. 220,221
(1966).
153. The Milwaukee Bar Association has seen fit to warn all lend-
ing institutions in the Milwaukee County area that the borrower will
19691
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Subject only to occasional restraint from a competitive market,
the lender has no reason to minimize the cost of the transaction,
since this cost will be borne entirely by the mortgagor. 15 4 The
institutional lender demands maximum security and will prob-
ably require title insurance for itself, but not for the buyer. Not
only does title insurance increase the mortgagee's protection, but
it is a prerequisite to sale of the mortgage in the national market.
Unless it is in some way affiliated with the title company,
the lender is normally indifferent to whether the insurance com-
pany is local or national. But, lenders are increasingly insisting
upon uniform, consistent, and prompt loan procedures. 15 To ob-
tain such service they are demanding that the entire mortgage
transaction be handled either by their own paid staff, by a nom-
inally independent attorney who does all of the lender's business
and is for practical purposes its alter ego, or by a title insurance
company.' 56
Under these circumstances, the lending institutions do not
appear to be promising allies in an attack upon a system they
themselves have established. Here again, however, such an as-
sumption may not be valid, because the task of establishing title
receive insufficient protection if he relies on the institution's attorney:
"Reputable lending institutions should encourage their customer to em-
ploy independent counsel." 26 UNAUTORZ PRAcTicf Nnws 332 (Win-
ter, 1960).
154. It has been suggested that builders in a competitive market
can exercise strong pressure on lending institutions to keep down clos-
ing costs. LOAN CLOSING COSTS, supra note 58, at 39.
155. Although speed is generally not considered a primary objective
in home buying transactions, gross delays by attorneys have in the past
unquestionably alienated business men accustomed to prompt service.
Speed of service is considered an inducement offered by the Chicago
Title & Trust Company in its Cook County operations, JOHNSTONE &
HOPSON, supra note 5, at 291, and the delay of lawyers in filling in merely
routine forms was a primary reason for the Arkansas Supreme Court's
reversal in Creekmore v. Izard, 236 Ark. 558, 367 S.W.2d 419 (1963), of its
earlier decision in Arkansas Bar Ass'n v. Block, 230 Ark. 430, 323 S.W.
2d 912 (1959). The indictments of "assembly line" methods of hand-
ling titles, found in such cases as In re Droker, 59 Wash. 2d 707, 370
P.2d 242 (1962) and San Antonio Bar Ass'n v. Guardian Abstract &
Title Co., 156 Tex. 7, 291 S.W.2d 697 (1956) are justified in the context of
the cases in which they were issued. However, the bar must be made
to understand the impatience of laymen when abstracts are permitted
to remain untouched on an attorney's desk for a matter of months, as
has not been uncommon in the past.
156. On the other hand, as the Texas Supreme Court has pointed
out, the institutional lender's argument that the transaction has become
so complex that he cannot rely on outsiders simply fortifies the need
for an independent attorney in the transactions. Hexter Title & Ab-
stract Co. v. Grievance Comm., 142 Tex. 506, 179 S.W.2d 946 (1944).
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is not the primary business of the lender, but is undertaken
simply to secure the mortgagee in its principal work of lending
money. The delays and inconveniences of the present system
cause habitual complaints from mortgagees. They use their own
counsel or title insurance because they feel they are compelled
to do so. If, however, they can be convinced that a general over-
haul of the conveyancing system will ensure them the service
they require while relieving them of much burdensome detail,
their co-operation with the advocates of reform may be effec-
tively mobilized. The most likely support in any such movement
would come, if at all, from large trade organizations such as the
Mortgage Bankers Association. But it must be remembered
that while such groups represent their members, they do not
control them, and active opposition to change could come from
powerful individual lenders. 157
E. NATIONAL TITLE INSURANCE COIVIPANIES
The position of the national title companies creates certain
ambivalences. They are not engaged in the unauthorized prac-
tice of law, except where they operate through abstract company
agents. Their existence is threatened by the growth of local
companies, suppression of which would permit the national com-
panies to expand their business into areas from which they are
now excluded. They also have a general interest in any im-
provement of the transfer system which would reduce title losses.
On the other hand, national title companies feel that it is
desirable to further the general concept of title insurance and
that an attack upon the local companies might impair the position
of the entire title insurance enterprise. The difficulty of enlist-
ing the support of such companies in an attack upon unauthorized
practice is further magnified by the fact that the American Land
Title Association embraces both segments of the industry and is
dominated by the most energetic and intransigent of the lay
conveyancing proponents. Since the strong conflicts of interest
between the two types of insurers have been sedulously ignored,
it is extremely doubtful whether an effective wedge could be
driven between them. 5s
157. The author is indebted to Mr. Moses L. Goldbas of Utica, New
York, for a file of proceedings of his local bar association's real estate
committee, indicating that a proposal made by the committee to local
lending institutions for an approved attorney system was summarily
rejected by the latter.
158. The report of the president of the American Land Title Asso-
ciation regarding the lack of progress in even a tentative approachment
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F. LocAL TITLE INSURANCE COMPANES
Local title companies will vigorously oppose any attempt to
apply unauthorized practice principles to their activities. If they
are forbidden to examine titles, their title plants will become
valueless except for providing abstracts, and their most impor-
tant source of revenue will be eliminated. The local title com-
panies would also object to a system whereby they would be per-
mitted to continue to examine and insure in return for their
withdrawal from all ancillary activities. Even if such a com-
promise served the public interest,159 it would be unacceptable
to the companies. It is true that their primary income comes
from title examination, and ancillary services are often furnished
at such low rates as to be an immaterial source of income.160
between his organization and the American Bar Association is not en-
couraging to say the least. Nichols, 541,440 Minutes Ago, 46 TITLE
NEWS 4 (No. 1, 1967). But see The National Conference of Lawyers
and Titlemen Described as an Opportunity to Serve the Public Interest,
47 TITLE NEWS 10 (No. 4, 1968).
The American Bar Association has long been an advocate of the
"conference" system for the purpose of resolving unauthorized prac-
tice disputes. However, its Standing Committee on Unauthorized Prac-
tice of Law has been careful to warn of the accompanying dangers:
They realize, too, that any compromise affecting the practice of
law agreed to by the conference groups may well result by
court interpretation in that segment of practice being forever
lost to the bar. They are also well aware that if the bar sits
idly by and apparently condones the practice of law by lay-
men in a field where for one reason or another the bar
chooses not to litigate the issue, that the courts are prone to
hold that the bar has forever lost that segment of practice
because of such inaction.
Report, 83 A.B.A. REP. 774,775 (1958).
Agreements between the bar associations and lay groups as to what
does or does not constitute practice are influential upon the courts, but
not binding. E.g., People v. Denver Clearing House Banks, 99 Colo. 50,
59 P.2d 468 (1936); State v. Indiana Real Estate Ass'n, 244 Ind. 214,
191 N.E.2d 711 (1963); Hulse v. Criger, 363 Mo. 26, 247 S.W.2d 855
(1952); State v. Dinger, 14 Wis. 2d 193, 109 N.W.2d 685 (1961).
159. The insurer is concerned only about its liability for monetary
recompense; the assured wants the property and the ability to use it in
the fashion contemplated. This point has been stressed by the English
Law Commission in rejecting the suggestion that some form of title
insurance (other than the government operated Land Registry) be
employed in that country. TRANSFER OF LAND, supra note 141, at 7-8.
160. At this point generalizations are difficult because we lack
adequate data and because what little information we have may be in
conflict. For example, in Bar Ass'n v. Union Planters Title Guar. Co.,
46 Tenn. App. 100, 326 S.W.2d 767 (1959), the Memphis title companies
offered to waive all charges made for drafting instruments on the as-
sumption that income derived from this source was insignificant. By
contrast, Roberts points out that in New York City the companies make
the largest part of their profit from ancillary services rather than from
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From this it might be assumed that the companies would be
happy to turn over this part of their conveyancing work to the
bar or any other group permitted to perform it. But for tactical
reasons, totally apart from questions of economics, a large num-
ber of the companies feel compelled to offer a great deal more
than insurance policies. In the first place, ancillary services, par-
ticularly if they are offered "free," may attract business and re-
tain customer good will. More importantly, the real objective of
the title insurance industry is the complete elimination of the
lawyer from the title transaction.161 The raison d'etre of the
companies is the unsatisfactory character of traditional convey-
ancing; they currently feel that they are riding a wave of public
insuring. Title Insurance, supra note 132, at 16 n.47. Willatt, supra
note 135, at 5, reports that the Chicago Title & Trust Company derives
10 per cent of its income from escrow services, but indicates that as a
general rule incidental sources of income are a minor matter to most title
insurance companies.
161. In Florida and Colorado the true objective of the title com-
panies has become more apparent as a result of life and death strug-
gles between the commercial companies and lawyers' title guaranty
funds. In Florida, the companies first attempted to purchase existing ab-
stract plants and then to refuse to issue any further abstracts. The
Fund countered this move by organizing a subsidiary, the Lawyers
Title Service, which assisted local groups of lawyers to organize
their own abstract companies. The title insurance companies then
shifted their ground and attempted to legitimate their activities and at
the same time curb the Fund by legislation and administrative action.
Carter, Proposed Legislation Further Regulating Title Insuring, 39 FLA.
B.J. 36 (1965). These efforts have been only partially successful
and the commercial companies have induced the state insurance com-
missioner to issue an order fixing the so-called "national" rate as the
"minimum risk rate premium" to be charged by all companies, includ-
ing the Fund. TrTLE INsuRANcE RATE PROMULGATION ORDER (March
7, 1967). The purpose of this order is to prevent the Fund from en-
joying the advantage of the lower rate which it has been able to charge
for insurance while at the same time making a profit. This order has
been attacked in the courts by the Fund and, as this is written, the case
has proceeded only to the point where certain procedural issues have
been disposed of by a District Court of Appeals. Meritt v. Williams,
210 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 1968).
In Colorado a similar fight against a recently organized Fund is
being carried out by the commercial insurers. In this case one of the
companies is offering a 20 per cent discount on insurance premiums for
the surrender of abstracts. Paralysis Creeps in Colorado, NEWSLETTER,
A.B.A. SPECIAL COMM. oN LAwYERs' TITLE GUAR. FuNDs (Apr. 4, 1964).
The report concludes, "The effect of this situation is that within a
comparatively short time this company will have a monopoly on title
work." In this case also the Fund is attempting to counter the com-
pany by establishing a lawyers' cooperative abstract plant. Letter
to Fund members, Aug. 25, 1967 and Jan. 10, 1968. The companies are
now attempting to obtain legislation which will cripple the Fund. Ac-
tion on the bill was blocked at the past session of the legislature but
the issue is expected to be revived at the next session.
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opinion and, to date, have shown limited interest in the protec-
tion of home buyers. They can therefore be expected to oppose
any reform which is more than palliative.
G. THE BAR
Logically, we should look to the bar to lead a judicial or
legislative fight against unauthorized practice and in support of
an improved conveyancing system. This logic does not neces-
sarily reflect experience, however, for at least in some parts of
the country it is inconsistent with institutional developments in
title work. Where lending institutions have relied on their own
lawyers, the rise of the highly stylized mortgage transaction has
concentrated title practice in the hands of a few specialists. Most
members of the bar, deprived of what was once the stock in trade
of the entire profession, are now indifferent to land transfer
problems and have turned their attention in other directions.
Meanwhile, the specialists are primarily loyal to their cor-
porate clients,162 a sentiment which is reinforced by very large
profits from volume practice. Complacency on the part of title
specialists involves a certain myopia, however. To the farsighted
person familiar with institutional growth it should be apparent
that as the volume of mortgage business increases and as lend-
ing institutions are more and more accustomed to having their
own man do the work, mortgagees will find it cheaper and
more convenient to create internal legal departments than to
hire outside counsel. Such a development has already occurred
within many savings and loan associations and within some
banks. If this trend continues, title practice among independent
lawyers will disappear, at least in the larger communities.
Although the existence of title insurance companies is un-
doubtedly an accelerating force, the transition from the use of
outside counsel to the formation of corporate legal departments
could occur without reference to them. From this long-range
standpoint, the interests of the title specialists and their clients,
the corporate lenders, are fundamentally at odds. But the short-
162. The ambivalence created by the dual loyalty of lawyers to
their clients and to their profession has received increasing comment in
recent years and has been expressed with special force by Johnstone
and Hopson. Johnstone, The Unauthorized Practice Controversy, A
Struggle Among Power Groups, 4 U. KAN. L. REv. 1, 2-3, 43 (1955);
JomHsToNE & HopsON, supra note 5, at 138-89. In this context one is re-
minded of the distinction attributed to Justice Brandeis, regarding the
difference between having clients and being somebody's lawyer. M.
MAYER, THE LAWYERS 4.
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range advantages to the specialist are so great that it is virtually
impossible to make them attentive to considerations of their ulti-
mate welfare. Property lawyers, it must be remembered, are the
most conservative branch of a basically conservative profes-
sion. 1 3 They consider themselves a part of the Establishment
and only with great difficulty can they be induced to enlist in
the ranks of those seeking to stamp out unauthorized practice by
the corporate entities which they represent. Individual lawyers
admittedly have spearheaded past movements for reform, but
these few enthusiasts have not been representative of the prop-
erty bar.
Disinterest on the part of individual title practitioners is
responsible for the failure of bar associations to take truly ef-
fective action.164 The organized bar must of necessity act
163. Chief Justice Warren has said, "The legal fraternity is still
living in the past. We have allowed the mainstream of progress to
pass us by." Speech to ALI Annual Meeting, 3 TRIAL 48 (No. 4 June/
July, 1967). And Cheatham has pointed out:
Successful lawyers are successful and effective under the sys-
tem they know. It requires an uncommon effort to contem-
plate, much less support, a changed professional system, and
old convictions give way very slowly before new evidence. A
widely prevailing attitude toward new forms of legal services
was well expressed in a report of a bar association committee
on legal clinics:
"In considering this phase of the problem it is only fair to
state that some members of the committee, as individuals, al-
ready entertain a view, founded upon sincere thought and full
consideration, that movements of this type are in defiance of old
traditions and concepts still held high in some quarters. That,
accordingly, no amount of data could justify the creation of
bureaus inasmuch as they are socially undesirable" (emphasis
added).
E. CHEATHAm, A LAWYER WHENz NEEDED 64 (1963). In 1967, another bar
committee reported:
Lawyers as a group are often insufferably stubborn in their
resistance to change in the law. Individually a lawyer can be
a liberal, even a radical, in seeking reform in the law. But
once he is placed in a group, a fluid liberalism congeals into
cold and chilling doubt as to the wisdom of leaving well charted
ways, no matter how cumbersome, circuitous and outmoded
those ways may be.
Progress on Uniform Probate Code, 2 REAL PROP., PROB. & TRUST J.
271, 272 (1967).
The belief that the excessive conservatism of lawyers and their
failures to consider the public interest in the face of their own im-
mediate financial betterment may produce a long-range decline in the
profession has been amply supported by the study of the English legal
profession, B. ABEL-Si HT & R. STEVENs, supra note 145. As said in
an anonymous comment on Beeching's Commission, "Judges and prac-
titioners are too inclined to regard the public as grist to their mill; too
few recognize that their sole justification is to provide a service, both
personal and public." THE LAW GUARDIAN 1 (No. 25, 1967).
164. The power of the bar associations is diluted, not only by the
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through unauthorized practice committees, committees whose
membership is drawn from the profession as a whole. Where
specialized problems arise, such committees turn for advice to
specialists in the particular field. But, for reasons already
stated, the "learned property lawyers" are generally the men
with the least inclination toward leading an attack on unauthor-
ized practice. As a consequence, it has been extremely difficult
to generate either the desire or the leadership necessary to
achieve direct reform.
V. CONCLUSION
Thus, the fundamental issue in modern conveyancing is how
home buyers can be assured adequate representation and protec-
tion. This issue transcends the mere question of whether title
companies are illegally practicing law and presents a broader
question for solution. The technical means of dealing with the
issue present fewer difficulties than does the mobilization of suf-
ficient political support. A review of the concerns of the various
affected interest groups must necessarily have a sobering influ-
ence upon even the most enthusiastic reformers, and past exper-
ience also invites pessimism. Despite continuing support for
changes in property law and practice from a small minority of
lawyers, there has been no substantial improvement; up to now,
alterations in practice have created more problems than they
have solved. Although some needed measures have been defeated
by active opposition, more commonly they have died as a result
of simple indifference on the part of the bar and lay groups con-
cerned with conveyancing. Nevertheless, experience should not
result in debilitating discouragement. A potential and untapped
source of support for reform has been suggested: lay groups
having a direct and substantial interest in land transfers.'0 5
These are groups having large political influence. Properly in-
formed of legal possibilities and mobilized under the leadership
of a few enlightened lawyers, 166 it is entirely possible that they
will provide the impetus necessary to achieve reform.
Future development of conveyancing procedures may de-
ambivalent attitudes of their members, but by the decentralization of
the bar itself and the small resources allocated to the work of un-
authorized practice committees. JoHrsrmx & HopsoN, supra note 5, at
190-91.; Resh, Safeguarding the Administration of Justice from Illegal
Practice, 42 MARQ. L. REv. 485, 489 (1959).
165. Jom1sToNu & HoPsON, supra note 5, at 552.
166. I have referred earlier to the conservative character of most
practitioners. See note 163 supra. David Dudley Field is quoted as
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pend primarily upon timing. If necessary reforms can be insti-
tuted in the near future, the courts may be induced to rigidly en-
force the conventional rules of unauthorized practice. Such en-
forcement will mean the restoration of the bar's traditional mon-
opoly of conveyancing. 16 7  If such reforms are not instituted,
the courts will probably exempt conveyancing from the prohi-
bition against corporate practice of law.
If corporate conveyancing is permitted, the courts should
call upon legislatures to pass supporting statutes. If, on the
other hand, the courts are willing to permit the organic growth
of corporate conveyancing without reference to legislation, they
should insist as an absolute minimum that such corporations as-
sume all the traditional responsibilities of those engaged in con-
veyancing. In particular, corporate conveyancers should be li-
able for negligence and should furnish home purchasers with
adequate title assurance.
If it is correct to assume that proper timing is of the essence
and that decisive action based on a clear understanding of basic
issues is required, the cases decided to date are not encouraging,
for they have been directed toward detail and have left funda-
mentals untouched. In this respect they remind one of the an-
cient English doggerel, inspired by the enclosure acts:
The law locks up both man and woman
Who steals the goose from off the common;
But lets the greater felon loose,
Who steals the common from the goose.
saying, "[Lawyers as a body never did begin a reform of the law, andjudging from experience, they never will. The reform must be the
work of laymen, aided by a miniority of lawyers." S. KIMBALL, HIS-
TORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYsTEm 306 (1961).
167. JOHNSTONE & HopsoN, supra note 5, at 192-94, are generally pes-
simistic in regarding the possibility of a rollback in the authorized
practice controversy.
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